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This Essay investigates the history of 'just price" and its influence on the
concept and practice of public utility regulation in the United States. It begins
with a discussion of the Scholastic understanding of just price and its
relationship to commutative justice, with particular attention to the problem of
coercion in economic exchange. The Essay then discusses the centrality ofjust
price to broader ideas of moral economy and to economic thought and
regulation in colonial America and the early United States. The heart of the
Essay shows how the idea ofjust price influenced public utility regulation as it
took shape during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As the Essay
demonstrates, received understandings of just price were fundamental to the
public utility idea and were at the center of battles over the proper approach to
utility valuation and rate regulation during the first halfofthe twentieth century.
The Essay concludes with a discussion of efforts to restructure formerly
regulated industries during the last quarter of the twentieth century, with
particular attention to the challenges faced by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission as it sought to ensure that prices in restructured natural gas and
electricity markets were just and reasonable. Although much of the Essay's
purpose is descriptive, several larger points emerge from this study. First, the
history ofjust price reveals that relations ofreciprocity andfairness in exchange
are at the very core of the public utility idea. When seen from this perspective,
public utility represents an important experiment in translating abstract
principles of economic justice and fair pricing into working rules for governing
key systems of provisioning in a modern industrial society. Second, the history
of just price reminds us that prices are more than signals; that they are also
relationships and that price relationships can be coercive. At root, the economics
of just price is an economics of coercion and, as such, an economics that
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resonates quite strongly with efforts by Progressive lawyers, legal realists, and
institutional economists to develop an approach to law and economics (and
economic regulation) that would put coercion at its center. Third, the history of
just price shows that competitive markets, when functioning properly, can be
powerful instruments for protecting consumers and facilitating fairness in
exchange. But it also underscores the importance of taking individual markets
on their own terms and recognizing that some markets, and the mechanisms of
price formation at their center, are more vulnerable to disruption and
manipulation than standard economic models suggest. Finally, at the most
general evel, the history ofjust price reminds us that for a very long time far
longer than the lfespan of classical and neoclassical economics-ethical nd
social concerns have been intimately bound up with conceptions of economy,
economic lfe, and the provision of necessities.
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Fair price, fair wage, fair trade, the doctrine of unconscionability,
prohibitions on price gouging, just and reasonable rates for public utilities-
these are just a sample of contemporary manifestations of a normative
commitment to fairness in economic exchange that reaches back centuries. All
of them, in one way or another, can trace their origins to the medieval doctrine
of "just price." As such, they can be viewed as recessive strains of a more general
conception of economic justice that predates modern capitalism one that views
markets and economic exchange as embedded within a broader set of social
institutions and norms.
The basic idea of just price holds that there should be equality or fairness
in economic transactions. The doctrine has its roots in Aristotle's conception of
corrective justice and was given shape by various medieval scholars starting in
the twelfth century. For every sale of goods or services, these authors held, there
was a just price (typically a range) that would ensure that neither party to the




overarching concern was to prevent coercion or compulsion in economic
relationships. When markets could not be trusted to ensure that goods and
services traded at their just price, various types of regulation, formal and
informal, were called upon to correct or fix prevailing prices and align them with
the just price.
While the idea of just price may seem decidedly out of fashion today,
especially when viewed against the formalism and sophistication of modem
economic theory, notions of just price continue to operate as background norms
in various discussions of economic policy. Longstanding efforts to police against
the exercise of fraud, unfair advantage, and the manipulation of prices in various
markets, to take the most obvious examples, all reflect a basic concern with
fairness in exchange. Similarly, those portions of antitrust law directed at
protecting consumers from high prices grew out of older common law concerns
with the impacts of engrossing, forestalling, and other forms of market
interference on fair prices.2 Echoes of just price can also be heard in a wide-
ranging set of contemporary debates on fair pricing from calls for a living wage
to efforts to control the prices of life-saving drugs.3 Populist political movements
focused on economic justice, from the right and the left, sometimes truck in an
1. See, e.g., Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) (quoting from the legislative
history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which referred to "[t]he idea of a free and open public
market [that] is built upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price
of a security brings [sic] about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price"
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 1383, at 11 (1984))). Few contemporary legal scholars appear to have much
interest in the idea of just price and its relevance to the price system. For an exception, see Robert C.
Hockett and Roy Kreitner, Just Prices, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2018).
2. See, e.g., Donald Dewey, The Common Law Background ofAntitrust Policy, 41 VA.
L. REV. 759, 762-66 (1955) (discussing the common law offenses of forestalling, regrating, and
engrossing as comprising one of three main lines of precedent that shaped the Sherman Act); WILLIAM
LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ACT 52 (1954)
(noting that "the common law against forestalling and engrossing was still in force in the United States
[in the late nineteenth century]; it could be made to serve purposes for which it was not originally intended,
and it was made the basis for section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits 'monopolizing'). Letwin
cites an early article by Edwin Alder for support. See Edwin Adler, Monopolizing at Common Law and
Under Section Two of the Sherman Act, 31 HARV. L. REV. 246, 258-63 (1917) (arguing that use of the
term "monopolizing" in Section 2 of the Sherman Act was intended to capture the old common law
offenses of engrossing, forestalling, and regrating"); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Reasonable Patent
Exhaustion, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 513 (2018); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 53 (1910)
("But as the principal wrong which it was deemed would result from monopoly, that is, an enhancement
of the price, was the same wrong to which it was though the prohibited engrossment would give rise, it
came to pass that monopoly and engrossing were regarded as virtually one and the same thing. In other
words, the prohibited act of engrossing because of its inevitable accomplishment of one of the evils
deemed to be engendered by monopoly, came to be referred to as being a monopoly or constituting an
attempt to monopolize.").
3. See, e.g., Christian Michel, What is a "Just Price"?, 2 J. MKT. & MORALITY 182,
182 (1999) (discussing just price in context of "fair trade" and "solidarity products"); Hagop M.
Kantarjian et al., Cancer Drugs in the United States: Justum Pretium-The Just Price, 31 J. CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 3600, 3600 (2013) (arguing that norms ofjust price should be used as a basis for controlling
the prices of cancer drugs); David G. Pfister, The Just Price of Cancer Drugs and the Growing Cost of
Cancer Care: Oncologists Need to be Part of the Solution, 31 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3487 (2013)
(arguing the same).
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inherited discourse of just price and fair exchange. And many of the
foundational experiments in behavioral economics have confirmed deep-seated
commitments to fair pricing commitments that anthropologists and others
suggest are shared across cultures.5
Likewise, certain domains of economic regulation can trace a strong
connection back to the doctrine of just price perhaps the most important of
which is public utility law in the United States. Although the classical origins
story of public utility regulation claims several ineages-the common law duty
to serve incumbent upon innkeepers, ferries, and other so-called common
callings;6 the granting of monopoly privileges and franchises to particular
enterprises, often with concomitant powers of eminent domain;' the notion that
certain businesses are "affected with a public interest"-the medieval
4. See generally MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN
HISTORY (2017); JOHN JUDIS, THE POPULIST EXPLOSION: HOW THE GREAT RECESSION TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN POLITICS (2016); CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION (2007).
5. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J.
BUS. S285, S299 (1986) (concluding on the basis of multiple empirical studies that people care about
fairness in economic transactions and are willing "to enforce fairness at some cost to themselves"); Daniel
Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON.
REV. 728, 729 (1986) [hereinafter Kahneman, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking] (observing that
commitments to fairness in economic transactions are often motivated by a "reference transaction, a
relevant precedent that is characterized by a reference price or wage, and by a positive reference profit to
the firm" and finding that "community standards of fairness" are governed by a "principle of dual
entitlement" whereby "[t]ransactors have an entitlement to the terms of the reference transaction and firms
are entitled to their reference profit"); Bruno S. Frey & Werner W. Pommerehne, On the Fairness of
Pricing: An Empirical Survey Among the General Population, 20 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 295, 305 (1993)
("There are good reasons to assume that individuals have a notion of a 'just' or 'fair price,' and of changes
theoreof, which it is important to take into account in positive analysis."). There is a vast anthropological
literature on norms of exchange and reciprocity in non-Western societies. See, e.g., MARCEL MAUSS, THE
GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (W.D. Halls trans., 1990) (1954);
MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS (1972). For more specific studies of "fair" or "just" pricing
in non-Western societies, see, for example, Jennifer Alexander & Paul Alexander, What's a Fair Price?
Price-Setting and Trading Partnerships in Javanese Markets, 26 MAN 493, 507-08 (1991) (describing the
notion of fair or just pricing in Javanese bargaining); and id. at 509 n.24 (surveying the anthropological
literature and noting that producers and vendors in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Mexico "have very clear
concepts ofjust price"). See also Jane I. Guyer, Composites, Fictions, and Risk: Toward an Ethnography
of Price, in MARKET AND SOCIETY: THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION TODAY 204 (Chris Hann & Keith
Hart eds., 2009) (noting that "throughout history, many authorities have aimed to maintain 'customary'
or 'just' prices").
6. See Charles K. Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of the Public Service
Companies Part 1, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 514, 515 (1911) ("The features which at early common law
distinguished those engaged in public or common callings (the original public service companies) from
those who were not so engaged, were the peculiar general duties laid upon the persons engaged in common
callings to serve all applicants for their services, and to perform such services with care without a special
assumpsit o that effect. To these primary duties there are certain corollaries, namely, that the service must
be reasonably adequate and rendered upon reasonable terms, and that it must be impartial.").
7. See Charles K. Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of the Public Service
Companies Part II, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 616, 638 (1911) ("[I]n the case of a great number of the so-called
public service companies of the present day the peculiar duties resting upon them grow out of the exercise
of public franchises.").
8. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); see also William J. Novak, The Public Utility
Idea and the Origins of Modern Business Regulation, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
139, 157 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017) (discussing "a more generalized and
autonomous concept of the public interest" as "the final culminating piece of the public utility idea"). In
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conception of just price has sometimes been identified as the core commitment
or "main stem" around which these other influences have coalesced.9
And yet, upon inspection, the history of just price and its relationship to
public utility is somewhat hazy, consisting of assertions and general claims that
tend to get repeated over time such that they become an accepted part of the
origins story without critical investigation. For scholars interested in public
utility and the history of economic regulation, a more careful assessment of the
doctrine of just price and its influence on the public utility idea would seem to
be in order.'0
This Essay seeks to begin that task. As part of a larger project on the history
of ways of price-making in public utility law, it investigates how the idea of just
price influenced the modem concept of public utility as it emerged and took
shape during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and how it in turn
has affected the practice of public utility regulation over the last century. The
Essay draws upon a large and diverse set of secondary literatures in intellectual,
economic, and legal history as well as key historical interventions by courts,
economists, and legal scholars. The overall goal is to trace the historical
trajectory of a particular idea: how it migrated and mutated over time, how it
gained and lost normative momentum in debates over economic regulation, and
how it continues to inform and color contemporary discussions of public utility
regulation and the role of markets and competition in ensuring that prices are
fair. Such an exercise almost inevitably carries with it a risk of reading too much
into the power and influence of the idea itself, not to mention assuming a certain
unwarranted stability of meaning across time. Where possible, this Essay seeks
to check these tendencies by showing how the idea of just price was interpreted
at different times and by attending to the specific ways in which particular actors
incorporated various notions of just price into their respective agendas.
In tracing this history, the Essay does not purport to resolve longstanding
debates about the one true meaning of just price. Identifying a single doctrine (or
even a coherent notion) of just price that could connect Aristotle's Ethics with
the Scholastics, the everyday exchanges of medieval markets, and the emergence
particular, Novak points to REXFORD TUGWELL, THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF PUBLIC INTEREST (1922), as
instrumental in articulating a "broader and more modem conception of general regulation in the public
interest." Id. at 158. As argued in Part II.A below, Tugwell's notion of the economic basis of public
interest bore a striking resemblance to earlier ideas ofjust price.
9. See MARTIN GLAESER, PUBLIC UTILITIES IN AMERICAN CAPITALISM 197 (1957).
10. See Steve N. Isser, Just and Reasonable: The Cornerstone of Energy Regulation
(Energy Law & Econ. Working Paper, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=2625131 [http://perma.cc/9KR3-DNNM] (discussing briefly the history ofjust price and its influence on
utility regulation). William Novak has done more than any contemporary historian to trace the origins of
the public utility idea. See, e.g., Novak, supra note 8; William J. Novak, Law and the Social Control of
American Capitalism, 60 EMORY L.J. 377 (2010). But Novak has very little to say about just price,
focusing instead on the common law of "public callings," state police power, and corporate charters as
the key elements of the public utility idea. Novak, supra note 8, at 144-52. Part of the goal of this Essay
is to complement Novak's history with another, previously neglected, aspect of the origins story of public
utility.
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of public utility in the United States is, needless to say, a task of exegesis and
historical inquiry that far exceeds the scope and capabilities of the current
undertaking. Instead, the Essay is most interested in investigating how the idea
ofjust price took on a life of its own during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries and exerted an important influence on the concept and practice of
public utility regulation with its central concern of ensuring that rates would be
"just and reasonable." It is, in other words, the received understandings of just
price and the ways in which they underwrote early conceptions of public utility
regulation that are the primary concerns of this Essay."
Part I discusses the basic idea of just price and situates it within medieval
understandings of commutative justice and more recent notions of moral
economy. It seeks to canvass, albeit briefly, the main currents of the debate over
the meaning of just price among medieval scholars, the centrality of just price to
broader ideas of moral economy, and, perhaps most importantly, how notions of
just price informed economic thought and regulation, primarily in colonial
America and the United States, prior to the late nineteenth century emergence of
the modem concept of public utility. The key takeaway of Part I is that although
the meaning of just price has varied over time and place, there was a singular
impulse at work behind the various early notions of just price: the prevention of
coercion or compulsion in economic transactions.'2 Viewed in this way, just
price looks less like a product of rigid Church doctrine than a flexible, pragmatic
approach to regulating a wide range of economic behavior across a diverse set
of conditions and circumstances.
Part II focuses specifically on how the idea of just price was incorporated
into the concept of public utility as it emerged and took shape in the United States
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It traces this history from
the 1870s, starting with Munn v. Illinois, to the middle of the twentieth century.
11. For reasons of space (and expertise), this Essay does not examine the influence of
just price on the development of antitrust doctrine or, more generally, consumer protection, both of which
surely deserve attention in any thorough history ofjust price.
12. There is a large literature, spanning multiple disciplines, addressing the problem of
coercion. Contemporary philosophical debates are typically traced to Robert Nozick's 1969 article,
Coercion. See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ERNEST NAGEL (Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969). With regard to economic coercion, the Scholastics offer
one of the earliest detailed treatments of the problem. In their view, economic coercion (or compulsion)
referred to situations where one party to an exchange was able to take advantage of the other's need and
thereby exact unfair gains (often manifest in a higher or lower price than would have prevailed in the
absence of coercion). See ODD LANGHOLM, THE LEGACY OF SCHOLASTICISM IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT:
ANTECEDENTS OF CHOICE AND POWER 6 (1998) (describing the Scholastic understanding of economic
compulsion as "compulsion by a person's own need, utilized by another person to his advantage"). As we
will see, this understanding of economic coercion resonates in important ways with that developed by
John Commons and Robert Lee Hale in the early twentieth century. See infra Section II.A. For Commons,
economic coercion involved "withholding from a person what does not belong to him but what is needed
by him." See JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 59 (1932); see also LANGHOLM,
supra, at 187-92 (discussing concepts of economic coercion in the work of Commons and Hale and their
resemblance to Scholastic understandings of economic compulsion). For a recent overview of economic
coercion in political and legal theory, see Hiba Hafiz, Beyond Liberty: Toward a History and Theory of




It shows how the just price concept animated early efforts to regulate the prices
charged by businesses "affected with a public interest," how these ideas were
incorporated into new legislation and the administrative practice of utility
regulation during the early decades of the twentieth century, and the ways in
which just price got caught up in the massive confusion created by the "fair
value" rule of Smyth v. Ames and the fifty-year debate over the valuation of utility
assets that ensued. As Part II argues, just price was at the center of Munn 's notion
of public interest and, as such, it provided the normative core of the emerging
public utility idea. As Part II also shows, however, Progressive ra commitments
to fair pricing and regulation in the public interest had to contend with strong
countervailing forces seeking to subordinate ideas of just price to constitutional
protections for private property. In this respect, the fair value rule of Smyth v.
Ames can be seen as an effort to extend such protections into the heart of the
public utility idea based on the fallacious notion that utility assets had an
intrinsic, fair value. Part II concludes with a discussion of the "end result" test
announced by the Supreme Court in its 1944 Hope Natural Gas decision-a
decision that finally put an end to the fair value rule and opened the way to a
more pragmatic approach to ratemaking that focused on the balance between
ratepayers and investors. Such an approach, this Essay argues, was much more
consistent with earlier notions of just price.
Part III discusses (briefly) the move to restructure various regulated
industries during the last quarter of the twentieth century, with particular
attention to those regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC). During this time, the widespread embrace of markets, combined with a
sustained critique of economic regulation, worked to invert prior concerns with
protecting consumers from the vagaries of the market and replace them with the
view that it was the pathologies of regulation and rent-seeking by regulated firms
that posed the bigger risks to consumers. As Part III shows, however, vestigial
notions of just price have influenced the manner in which FERC has approached
markets (and the prices that result) in its efforts to unbundle and restructure the
natural gas and electricity industries. FERC's core assumption in its restructuring
efforts has been that competitive markets what it sometimes refers to as "the
forces of competition"-can be relied upon to ensure that prices for natural gas
and electricity satisfy the statutory just and reasonable standard. In many
respects, this assumption echoes earlier understandings of just price as the
"normal competitive price"-that is, the price expected to prevail if the forces of
competition are functioning as they do in "normal" markets. All of which puts a
premium on the market oversight and enforcement responsibilities of regulators
such as FERC-tasks that have proven to be far more challenging than expected.
Although much of this Essay's purpose is descriptive, reflecting an effort
to recover the changing understandings of just price over time and trace their
influence on the public utility concept, several larger points emerge from this
study. First, the history of just price reminds us that relations of reciprocity and
fairness in exchange are at the very core of the public utility idea. Public utility,
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in its modem incarnation, can thus be seen as one of our most important and
long-lived experiments (flawed as it is) in regulating private capital and
harnessing it to public ends an experiment that has sought to translate
principles of commutative justice into a set of working rules for governing key
systems of provisioning in a modem industrial society.
Second, the history of just price also reminds us that prices are more than
signals; that they are also relationships and that price relationships can be
coercive. At root, the economics of just price is an economics of coercion, and,
as such, an economics that resonates quite strongly with efforts by Progressive
lawyers, legal realists, and institutional economists to develop an approach to
law and economics (and economic regulation) that would put coercion at its
center.
Third, the history of just price shows that competitive markets, when
functioning properly, could (and can) be powerful instruments for protecting
consumers and facilitating fairness in exchange. Contrary to various caricatures
of Scholastic economic thought, just price was not some sort of relic of a
religious past unalterably opposed to markets. The Scholastics were, in fact,
quite pragmatic in their approach to market transactions, as were those who
mobilized ideas of just price and moral economy during later times. But it is
important to recognize in this respect that early conceptions ofjust price emerged
out of and reflected a different understanding of markets and economic life-not
the anonymous, self-regulating market of modem economic theory but a socially
embedded, morally thick locus of economic exchange. Markets, in this earlier
view, were concrete and particular, tied to specific times and places, rather than
free-floating abstractions operating according to natural laws. Most importantly,
markets were viewed as means rather than ends-tools that, under the right
circumstances, could be used to protect buyers and sellers from coercive
transactions.
As for the larger normative implications of all of this, it is important to
emphasize that this Essay does not reflect, much less advocate, any sort of
sentimental attachment to earlier conceptions of moral economy or economic
justice that can or should be resurrected so as to serve as a counterweight to the
problems of economic inequality and unfair exchange in our own time.
Regardless of one's sympathies for earlier, more overtly normative conceptions
of the economy, it would be folly to suggest hat recovering the history of older
ideas such as just price and excavating their contemporary influence could ever
substitute for the messy and difficult political work that any effective campaign
for economic justice requires. None of which is to suggest hat ideas of just price
or public utility or economic justice could not be refashioned and redeployed in
the face of current challenges.13 Ideas and words matter and our public
728
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CAPITALIST STATE (2013). Reiff devotes a large part of his book (especially chapters 2 and 4) to the
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vocabularies are obviously important tools in understanding and framing
political projects.'4 But seeking to understand the history of these contested
concepts-to trace their genealogies in order to show something of their public
lives over long expanses of time-can never be more than a modest step in such
an undertaking.
I. Just Price
To the modem ear, the phrase "just price" sounds odd, even contradictory.
Prices are not usually considered to have any ethical or moral content.5 Rather,
they are viewed as signals-vital pieces of information that reveal the
interactions between supply and demand.'6 In performing this signaling function,
prices allow for the coordination of economic activity in a manner that
maximizes allocative efficiency." The very notion that prices could or should
concept ofjust price-a concept hat he argues should beat the center of a new theory of exploitation and
an agenda for economic justice.
14. Cf DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS
SINCE INDEPENDENCE 11 (1987) ("To unravel the histories of this handful of words is to begin to fathom
the processes out of which political language is made.").
15. See, e.g., R. G. Collingwood, Economics as a Philosophical Science, 35 INT'L. J.
ETHICS 162, 174 (1926) ("It is, therefore, impossible for prices to be fixed by any reference to the idea of
justice or any other moral conception. A just price, a just wage, a just rate of interest, is a contradiction in
terms. The question of what a person ought to get in return for his goods and labor is a question absolutely
devoid of meaning. The only valid questions are what he can get in return for his goods or labor, and
whether he ought to sell them at all.").
16. Hayek famously emphasized the role of the price system as a "mechanism for
communicating information" that worked to solve the knowledge problem at the heart of modern
economies. See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526-27
(1945) ("We must look at the price system as such a mechanism for communicating information if we
want to understand its real function .... The most significant fact about this system is the economy of
knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to know in order to be
able to take the right action. In abbreviated form, by a kind of symbol, only the most essential information
is passed on, and passed on only to those concerned. It is more than a metaphor to describe the price
system as a kind of machinery for registering change, or a system of telecommunications which enables
individual producers to watch merely the movement of a few pointers, as an engineer might watch the
hands of a few dials, in order to adjust their activities to changes of which they may never know more
than is reflected in the price movement."). Hayek, of course, was unsparing in his critique of neoclassical
price theory, with its assumptions of perfect information and competitive equilibrium, but his
understanding of prices as signals or information has had a deep, ifunderappreciated, effect on mainstream
economics during the post-World War II period. See PHILIP MIROWSKI AND EDWARD NIK-KHAH, THE
KNOWLEDGE WE HAVE LOST IN INFORMATION: THE HISTORY OF INFORMATION IN MODERN ECONOMICS
53 (2017) (arguing against standard histories of the economics of information as beginning with Arrow,
Stigler, game theory, and the like and positing instead that one must go back to Hayek and the Mont
Pelerin society to find the origins of a "self-conscious 'economics of information').
17. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 10-11 (2008) ("The problem solved
by a price system is an extremely complicated one, involving the coordination of the activities of tens and
hundreds of millions ofpeople all over the globe and their prompt adjustment to ever-changing conditions.
The price system is an extremely subtle and complex device for solving this problem. Casual observation
of the world leads to an underestimation of the complexity of both the problem and the device used to
solve it, because insofar as the price system works, we are hardly conscious of its workings. The
complexities are brought to our attention only when something goes wrong.").
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serve some sort of ethical purpose seems out of synch with our contemporary
understanding of market economies.'
But markets do not always work as intended, and prices can sometimes
depart quite significantly from what the fundamentals of supply and demand
would dictate. When market distortions, manipulation, or pricing decisions cause
prices to deviate from their "reference" levels, common intuitions of fair pricing
are often invoked and regulation is sometimes called upon to return prices to
their "normal" levels.'9 And even in cases of "normally" functioning markets,
particularly in the case of economic necessities and conditions of extreme
scarcity, prevailing notions such as "willingness to pay" or "what the market will
bear" tend to clash with prior commitments to fairness in economic
relationships.20
As we will see, these commitments to fairness have a long history and bear
a strong resemblance to older ideas of commutative justice, just price, and moral
economy the subjects of this part. Commutative justice provided the basic
philosophical framework for the development of the just price idea a
development hat grew out of efforts by the Scholastics to fashion a theory of
economic exchange that was rooted in their broad understanding of justice, and
18. See Marion Fourcade, The Fly and the Cookie: Alignment and Unhingement in 21"
Century Capitalism, 15 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 661, 664 (2017) ("What economists find liberating about the
price system is the fact that it seems to stand outside of morality altogether: the market does not have to
be fair to be a superior force in organizing human activities, in other words to coordinate human needs in
the most efficient manner possible."). But see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 60 (Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter ed., 1954) ("Preoccupation with the ethics of pricing ... is
precisely one of the strongest motives a man can have for analyzing actual market mechanisms."); 5 JOAN
ROBINSON, Markets in COLLECTED ECONOMIC PAPERS OF JOAN ROBINSON 164 (1979) ("The doctrines
of laissez faire were very attractive, not only to those who gained most directly from the market system.
If the economy is a self-regulating mechanism and economics a system of scientific laws, moral and
political problems are excluded from it. Questions of social justice do not arise, all the operations of public
administration are to be strictly neutral between interested parties. Ethics can be discussed on Sunday. It
is considered unsound, soft-headed and unpatriotic to bring it in to week-day business. As soon as we
recognize that the market, by its very nature, is necessarily a scene of conflicting interests, every element
in it (such as ... the price of cocoa beans) becomes a moral and political problem. This is tormenting
because there are no longer any 'principles of economics' to provide safe and simple rules for finding the
correct solutions.").
19. See Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking, supra note 5, at
729-30; Frey & Pommerehne, supra note 5.
20. This is perhaps most apparent today in the case of price gouging for necessities in
the wake of natural disasters uch as hurricanes, but it also surfaces in the case of so-called surge pricing.
See, e.g., Neil Irwin, Why Surve Prices Make Us So Mad: What Springsteen, Home Depot and a Nobel
Winner Know, NY TIMES (15 October 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/14/upshot/why-surge-
prices-make-us-so-mad-what-springsteen-home-depot-and-a-nobel-winner-know.html [http://perma.cc
/7SX3-UHA8]. The basic commitment to willingness to pay, of course, is much older. Thomas Hobbes,
among others, took direct aim at ideas of commutative justice and just price, arguing that "the value of all
things contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contractors and therefore the just value is that
which they be contented to give." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 208 (MacPherson ed., 1968). For a
recent argument in defense of price gouging, see Matt Zwolinski, The Ethics of Price Gouging, 18 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 347, 348 (2008) (arguing that "standard cases of price gouging provide great benefit to those
in desperate need, that hey tend to lack the morally objectionable features often ascribed to them such as
coercion and exploitation, and that attempts to prohibit the practice will harm individuals who are already
vulnerable and can least afford to bear further harm").
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particularly Aristotle's notion of corrective justice. Although they varied in their
interpretations of the precise meaning of just price (the term itself is surely one
of the more capacious in the history of economic thought), two dominant
understandings have generally been attributed to the Scholastics: a labor or cost-
based approach and a market-based approach. In both cases, however, the central
concern was with preventing one party to the transaction (usually the seller) from
exacting unfair gains from the other (most often the buyer). This conception of
just price took on considerable significance in the context of markets for grain
and other necessities, particularly in times of dearth, and provided one of the
most important ouchstones for the idea of moral economy as developed by E.P.
Thompson and others. This Part concludes, therefore, with a discussion of the
relationship of just price to broader understandings of moral economy and
fairness in economic relationships during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, with particular attention to the influence of just price on economic
thought and economic regulation in colonial America and the early United
States.
The overall goal of this Part is to survey the dominant interpretations ofjust
price prior to the late nineteenth century, and to show how the idea was mobilized
in different contexts as a basis for regulating prices and delineating the
boundaries of fair exchange. While not structured as a standard, chronological
narrative, this Part does seek to capture the long historical arc of the idea of just
price from Aristotle and the Scholastics up until the late nineteenth century all
of which provides critical background for the discussion of just price and its
influence on the modern concept of public utility that took shape during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
A. Commutative Justice
The idea of just price traces its origins to the Aristotelian concept of
corrective justice, which was refashioned as commutative justice by Thomas
Aquinas and other medieval scholars after the rediscovery and translation into
Latin of a large number of Aristotle's writings during the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries.2' In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle famously identified two types
21. On the European reception of Aristotle's work during the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, see IZHAK ENGLARD, CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: FROM ARISTOTLE TO MODERN
TIMES 12 (2009) (characterizing the translation into Latin of Aristotle's Ethics, as well as some Arabic
commentaries in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, as "a major event in Western thought creating the
central intellectual movement of scholasticism"); see also C.B. MACPHERSON, THE RISE AND FALL OF
ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND OTHER PAPERS 5 (1985) ("The concept of economic justice gets its first clear
presentation in the fourth century BC, by Aristotle . . .. [I]t was only then that the idea of economic justice
as a problem requiring separate attention arose. The more ancient civilizations, in which the market had
not been, or even threatened to be, an autonomous organizing mechanism of production and exchange,
had not needed any such concept. There is no record of any speculation, in the Bronze Age empires and
kingdoms, of any such notions of economic justice."); ODD LANGHOLM, PRICE AND VALUE IN THE
ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION: A STUDY IN SCHOLASTIC ECONOMIC SOURCES 14-16 (1979) (discussing
Aristotle's notion of justice in economic exchange as understood by his medieval interpreters); DIANA
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22of particular justice: distributive and corrective. Whereas distributive justice
was concerned with the allocation of goods in a community ("honor or money
or any of the other things divisible among those who share in the regime"),
corrective justice was concerned with transactions between individuals, both
voluntary and involuntary.3 A transaction that satisfied corrective justice
according to Aristotle was one that preserved equality in the exchange,
understood as an arithmetic proportion around a mean, and thereby avoided an
unfair gain for either party.24
While Aristotle's notion of corrective justice has had a deep and long-
standing influence across many domains, it has sometimes been interpreted
narrowly as focused on remedy or restitution for harms suffered in transactions
(the term itself suggests as much) rather than on a broader notion of proper
dealings in exchange.2 5 This broader understanding, it has been argued, is better
reflected by Aquinas's notion of "commutative justice."26  For Aquinas,
commutative justice pertained to the full range of voluntary and involuntary
WOOD, MEDIEVAL ECONOMIC THOUGHT 133 (2002) ("In his Nicomachean Ethics (V, v) Aristotle set up
a model of justice in exchange which is fundamental to the idea of the just price.").
22. ARISTOTLE'S NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 94-95 (Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D.
Collins trans., 2011); see also D.G. Ritchie, Aristotle's Subdivisions of Particular Justice', 8 CLASSICAL
REV. 185, 185 (1894) (discussing Aristotle's distinction between distributive and corrective justice).
23. ARISTOTLE'S NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 22, at 95, 96-97.
24. Id. at 97; see also id. at 100-01 (discussing corrective justice in the context of
reciprocity or equality in exchange and using the example of a farmer and shoemaker: "there will be
reciprocity when terms are made equal, and the result will be that, as a farmer stands in relation to a
shoemaker, so the work of the shoemaker stands in relation to that of the farmer"). As Karl Polanyi has
observed, Aristotle's notion of the economy was quite different from ours-always subordinated to the
demands of community and the requirements of reciprocity in human relationships. See Karl Polanyi,
Aristotle Discovers the Economy, in PRIMITIVE, ARCHAIC, AND MODERN ECONOMIES 97 (George Dalton
ed., 1971) (observing that for Aristotle, "[t]he just price ... derives from the demands ofphilia [the good
will of the community] as expressed in the reciprocity which is of the essence of all human community").
25. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 178 (2d ed. 2011) ("The
real problem with Aristotle's account is its emphasis on correction, on the remedying of the inequality
that arises when one person injures or takes from another, or when one party fulfills his side of a bargain
while the other does not. This is certainly one field of problems of justice, but even when added to the
field of distributive justice it leaves untouched a wide range of problems. 'Correction' and 'restitution'
are notions parasitic on some prior determination of what is to count as a crime, a tort, a binding
agreement, etc.").
26. Id. at 179 ("So it was that Thomas Aquinas, purporting to interpret Aristotle
faithfully, silently shifted the meaning of Aristotle's second class of particular justice, and invented a new
term for it: 'commutative justice.' Many followers of Aquinas have understood commutativa as
'pertaining to exchanges.' But the advantage of Aquinas's new term is precisely that, in his usage, it is
limited neither to correction nor to voluntary or business transactions, but is almost as extensive as the
term commutatio in classical Latin (= 'change'), limited only by its contextual restriction to the field of
human interaction. With this term, then, we can cover the whole field in which, problems of allocation of
common stock and the like apart, the problem is to determine what dealings are proper between persons
(including groups)."). Aquinas distinguishes between commutative and distributive justice in his Summa
Theologica. See THOMAS AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS 123-29 (William P. Baumgarth
& Richard J. Regan eds., Richard J. Regan, trans., 2d ed. 2002) (discussing distributive and commutative
justice as species of particular justice). But see LANGHOLM, supra note 21, at 14 (observing that "the
classification of economic justice in relation to the two main kinds of particular justice [distributive and
commutative] is one of the many unsettled questions of Aristotle's exchange analysis").
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relationships between private persons, including economic exchange, and was
not limited to correction or restitution for harms suffered. 27
With regard to economic transactions, commutative justice required that
there be a rough equality in the values exchanged between buyer and seller.8
Instances of compulsion or coercion, where one party was able to extract more
than his or her fair share from the exchange, violated commutative justice.29 The
just price (justum pretium), accordingly, was the price that ensured equality
between buyer and seller in any particular transaction. For the scholastics, as we
will see, this was typically tied to the "common estimation" of the community
that is, a public assessment of what constituted a fair price for a particular good
or service.30
B. Medieval Markets
Determining whether any particular transaction satisfied the requirements
of commutative justice was often easier said than done, and the literature on the
just price doctrine reflects a range of views regarding what constituted the just
price for the medieval authorities. For Max Weber and other early twentieth
century scholars of medieval economic history, just price was one of the defining
features of an economic ethic that was qualitatively different from that which
would later take hold with the rise of capitalism.3' According to these scholars,
27. AQUINAS, supra note 26, at 124 (asserting that commutative justice applies to the
relationship of one private person to another); id. at 126 ("But in exchanges, things are rendered to
individual persons because of things received from them. And this is most apparent in buying and selling,
regarding which we first notice the character of commutation. And so the things exchanged need to be
equal, so that one should restore to another as much as one is enriched by what belongs to the other.");
see also Raymond de Roover, Scholastic Economics: Survival and Lasting Influence from the Sixteenth
Century to Adam Smith, 69 Q.J. ECON. 161, 162 (1955) ("What the Doctors in the Middle Ages were
really interested in was to determine the rules of justice governing social relations. Following Aquinas,
they distinguished two kinds ofjustice: [1] distributive justice, which regulated the distribution of wealth
and income, according to the place of the individual in society, and [2] commutative justice, which applied
to the reciprocal dealings between individuals, that is, to the exchange of goods and services."); FINNIS,
supra note 25, at 178 (describing commutative justice as directed at the question of "what is fitting, fair,
or just between the parties to the relationship").
28. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 200-03
(1998) (discussing Aquinas's understanding of economic exchange as founded on the principle of equality
or equivalence in the exchange); JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT
DOCTRINE 13 (1991) ("[Clommutative or rectificatory justice follows an arithmetic proportion. One
person has too much and another too little. He has too much in involuntary transactions because he has
taken something from the other, in voluntary transactions because things of unequal value have been
exchanged. Justice is done by taking the amount necessary to restore equality from one party and giving
it to the other.").
29. See FINNIS, supra note 28, at 203 ("Exacting an unfair, i.e. 'unequal,' price, even
from a 'willing buyer, is indeed selling what is not one's own to sell. The just price is one at which all
parties to the transaction are, so far as possible, compensated proportionally for what they are giving up.").
30. De Roover, supra note 27 at 164-65 (noting that San Bernardino of Sienna (1380-
1444), among others, held that the just price was "determined by the 'estimation made in common by all
the citizens of a community').
31. MAX WEBER, GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY 358 (Frank Knight trans., 1927)
[hereinafter WEBER, GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY] (observing that "medieval economic ethics excluded
higgling, overpricing, and free competition, and were based on the principle ofjust price and the assurance
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the just price of any particular good or service was tied not to what it could fetch
in the market but rather to its cost of production and to the producer's station in
life.32 This cost-based approach tojust price, as we will see, reemerged in several
early twentieth century writings on public utility. 33 More generally, it has been
cited by some as the basis for the labor theory of value embraced by classical
political economy. As R.H. Tawney put it in his discussion of just price,
"payment may properly be demanded by the craftsmen who make the goods, or
by the merchants who transport them, for both labour in their vocation and serve
the common need. The unpardonable sin is that of the speculator or the
middleman, who snatches private gain by the exploitation of public necessities.
The true descendant of the doctrines of Aquinas is the labor theory of value. The
last of the Schoolmen was Karl Marx." 34
By the middle of the twentieth century, new research questioned this earlier
cost-based understanding ofjust price. The revisionist interpretation held that the
medieval authorities understood the just price in most cases as the market price
and that price regulation only applied in specific cases of scarcity of certain
to everyone of a chance to live"); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1188 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., 1978) (tracing the origins of "just price" to the "primeval ethic of the neighborhood, which
knows barter only as the exchange of occasional surpluses or of products of one's own labor" and where
"one does not haggle for the price, but merely asks for the restitution of one's own cost (including the
'living wage') if an exchange takes place at all"); see also Just Price, VIII ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES (Edwin R. A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1932) ("Because the just price was
essentially not an economic but an ethical and social concept it did not necessarily coincide with the
market price .... The social function of the doctrine was to prevent material gain from becoming the sole
motive of economic activity, to extend the Christian way of life to the economic sphere and to safeguard
the traditional social structure.").
32. See WEBER, GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY, supra note 31, at 138-41 (discussing
the "livelihood policy" of the medieval guilds and its connection to "fair prices" for artisans so that they
could maintain their station in life"); R.H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 53 (Verso
2015) (1926) (discussing the "characteristic doctrine" of just price as one that "insisted on the just price
as the safeguard against extortion; . . . [pirices must be such, and no more than such, as will enable each
man to have the necessaries of life suitable for his station"); Robinson, supra note 18, at 158 (describing
concept ofjust price as "a system of valuations which enable the producers and merchants to maintain life
at a level suited to their respective position in society"); see also RUDOLF KUALLA, THE THEORY OF THE
JUST PRICE: A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC VALUE 42 (R. D. Hogg
trans., 1940) ("Price regulation in the Middle Ages was always the function of the authorities. In the
towns, in which business was concentrated, the competent authority was either the guild or a person or
body under its influence. To this end, prices were fixed at levels at which they covered the producer's
labour and other costs and left him a profit, it being assumed that every undertaking, operating on a certain
minimum scale, should bring in enough to meet its own costs and support the master and his family. This
price policy was in entire harmony with the requirements of justice, as conceived by the representatives
of the Church.").
33. See infra Section II.A.
34. TAWNEY, supra note 32 at 48. Tawney's famous quip about Marx and the labor
theory of value raises a larger issue, which cannot be treated in any detail here, about the relationship
between the medieval conception of just price and later theories of value in economics. See, e.g., Robert
L. Heilbroner, The Problem of Value in the Constitution of Economic Thought, 50 SOC. RES. 253, 254
(1983) (discussing the "general problematic of value" as "the effort to tie the surface phenomena of
economic life to some inner structure or order"); JOAN ROBINSON, ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY 46 (1962)
("Among all the various meanings of value, there has been one all the time under the surface, the old
concept of a Just Price.").
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essential goods or in the absence of competition.35 Such a view no doubt received
a considerable boost from Joseph Schumpeter who, in his posthumous 1954
History ofEconomic Analysis, traced a direct line from Aristotle to Aquinas and
the later Scholastics-all of whom, he argued, equated the just price with the
price that prevailed in markets operating under "normal" conditions.36
In making this claim, Schumpeter and others stressed the emphasis by
Scholastic writers on the "public's evaluation" or "common estimation" as the
basis for determining just price. 37 According to these scholars, competitive
markets operating under "normal" conditions provided the most obvious means
of divining this common estimation.38 Jacob Viner made the point explicit in his
1959 Henry Simons lecture at the University of Chicago Law School:
The scholastics maintained that it was a violation of commutative justice to sell
at a higher price or to buy at a lower price than the "just price," which they
explained as the price according to "common estimation." Until recently, this has
been commonly interpreted as meaning the fixing of prices by civil authorities or
by wise men, in the interest of justice and as a restraint on the avarice of
merchants, and as demonstrating that the medieval church was hostile to the free
market. Modem scholarship, however, has conclusively demonstrated that except
for a few nominalists, the standard late-medieval meaning of "common
estimation" was market price under free competition, and that some of the
35. See, e.g., John W. Baldwin, The Medieval Theories of the Just Price, 49 TRANS.
AM. PHIL SOC. 1, 54, 75-80 (1959) (describing the just price of the Canonists and Romanists of the
thirteenth century and of Aquinas and his followers as including the current price determined in
competitive conditions as well as the legal price set by the relevant authorities); Raymond De Roover,
The Concept ofthe Just Price: Theory andEconomicPolicy, 18 J. ECON. HiST. 418,420-21 (1958) ("[T]he
generally accepted efinition of the just price is wrong and rests on misinterpretation of the scholastic
position on the matter. According to the majority of the doctors, the just price did not correspond to cost
of production as determined by the producer's social status, but was simply the current market price, with
this important reservation: in cases of collusion or emergency, the public authorities retained the right to
interfere and to impose a fair price."); JOHN T.NOONAN, THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY 86 (1957)
("The just price is the market price.").
36. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 61 (1954) (arguing
that Aristotle understood just prices as "normal competitive prices"); id. at 93 (arguing that Aquinas's
notion of just price was "strictly Aristotelian and should be interpreted exactly as we have interpreted
Aristotle's"). But see M.I. Finley, Aristotle and Economic Analysis, 47 PAST & PRESENT 3, 12-15 (1970)
(criticizing the arguments of Schumpeter and others that Aristotle was engaged in economic analysis
aimed at a theory of market prices rather than seeking to develop an understanding of exchange within his
notion ofjustice). Part of the problem, according to Finney, is that Schumpeter and other economists made
the mistake of seeking to understand Aristotle through the lens of modern economic institutions and ideas.
Id. at 25. Karl Polanyi made a similar point. See Polanyi, supra note 24, at 95-97 (discussing Aristotle's
understanding of the economy and prices as always integrated with his broader conceptions of community
and justice).
37. SCHUMPETER, supra note 36 at 93 (discussing the just price as "the price that
consists of the public's evaluation of the commodity (justum pretium . . . in quadam aestimatione
consistit), which can only mean normal competitive price, or value in the sense of normal competitive
price, where such a price exists").
38. Id. Like Schumpeter, Jacob Viner stressed that for the scholastics, "market" meant
"a competitive market, operating under normal circumstances" and that this provided the basis for
common estimation. See Jacob Viner, The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire, 3 J.L. & ECON. 45, 53
(1960).
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scholastics even used the term equivalent to "common estimation in or by the
market."39
To be sure, aspects of this new interpretation likely resulted from a
tendency to read history backwards and to impose modem economic concepts
and categories on an earlier time.40 But the new scholarship did have support in
the primary texts, and it also recognized that even if the just price was typically
the market price, it was still an "essentially normative" concept and did not
reflect some sort of proto-version of laissez faire.4 ' Viner emphasized, in this
respect, that it would be a mistake to interpret the scholastics "as enthusiasts for
the free market."42 Rather, "their acceptance of the desirability of competition
rested solely on belief in its efficacy in protecting individuals from exploitation
as sellers or as buyers."4 3 Competitive markets operating under "normal
conditions," in other words, were attractive to the Scholastics not because of their
ability to deliver on modem goals of allocative efficiency but because they
provided an antidote to the exercise of coercion or compulsion by buyers or
sellers in economic transactions.44
39. Viner, supra note 38, at 53. Viner had a longstanding interest in the intellectual
history of economics that included a particular interest in medieval economics, a topic on which he was
fully engaged at the time of his Simons lecture. See, e.g., Fritz Machlup, What was Left on Viner's Desk,
80 J. POL. ECON. 353,354-56 (1972) (describing Viner's efforts during the last decade of his life to prepare
a large volume on religious thought and economic society, including a long, completed chapter on the
economic doctrines of the scholastics). This chapter, along with three others, was published posthumously
in a special 1978 issue of the journal, History ofPolitical Economy. See Jacob Viner, Chapter Two: The
Economic Doctrines ofthe Scholastics, 10 HIST. POL. ECON. 46 (1978).
40. See, e.g., LANGHOLM, supra note 12, 85 (pointing out that the modern conception
of an autonomous self-regulating market would have made little sense to the medieval writers).
41. Baldwin, supra note 35, at 8; see also id. ("Beginning chiefly with the twelfth and
lasting until the sixteenth century the thinkers of the Middle Ages adopted the termjustumpretium, refined
its meaning, and enlarged its importance until the expression became a legal device, a moral imperative,
and an economic doctrine.").
42. Viner, supra note 38, at 53.
43. Id.
44. But see Stephen Worland, Justice and Welfare Economics, 63 REV. SOC. ECON.
369, 376-77 (2005) ("Welfare economics, then, suggests that  structure of prices, wherein each individual
price conforms with commutative justice is necessary for the common good. Furthermore, it might be
argued that such a price structure would provide not only an efficient allocation of resources, but also
what could, in Scholastic social philosophy, be considered a just distribution of income."); Cyril A. Zebot,
The Roots of Welfare Economics: A Review Article, 26 REV. SOC. ECON. 168, 168 (1968) ("The scholastic
doctrine ofjust price, . . . which was predicated on grounds of inter-personal commutative justice, has in
the light of modern welfare economics received its broader meaning as the necessary conditions of the
economic system to fulfill its teleological task as efficiently as possible."). To be sure, the Scholastic case
for justice in exchange rests on very different foundations than the utilitarian basis of welfare economics.
That they get to the same place with respect to competitive markets may be an interesting coincidence,
but their very different underlying normative commitments leads them to different places in terms of the
prospects for and wisdom of various government controls and interventions in the economy. For welfare
economics, in contrast to the Scholastic doctrine of just price, coercion and compulsion in economic
relationships are condemned not because they interfere with the rights of individuals or run afoul of
commutative justice, but rather because they reduce aggregate consumer welfare.
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More recent scholarship has criticized some of the cruder versions of the
"market price" interpretation of just price.45 In pointing out the anachronisms
embedded in such an understanding, these scholars have emphasized that the
idea of an autonomous market economy made no sense to the medieval writers.46
Markets were always embedded in and subordinated to a broader set of social
norms and customary practices. In addition, although market prices might align
with the just price under some circumstances, the all too common conditions of
scarcity and small numbers of buyers and sellers meant that "normal"
competitive prices were the exception rather than the rule.47
Only in cases where competition was sufficiently robust to "combat the
exploitation of economic need" would markets be counted on to ensure that
prices were just.4 8 In cases of relatively thin markets, with limited numbers of
45. See, e.g., Fabio Monsalve, Scholastic Just Prices Versus Current Market Price: Is
It Merely a Matter ofLabelling, 21 EUR. J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 4, 5 (2014) ("[T]he just price is not
merely the market price because of the fundamental moral dimension of economic agents in the Scholastic
world vision."); Langholm, supra note 40, at 85 ("Until a few decades ago, it was not uncommon in
critical studies to encounter the suggestion that the medieval scholastics imply permitted the forces of
the market to run their course and accepted the resultant 'common estimate of the market' as the just price.
More recently, this liberalistic interpretation has been challenged by a younger generation of scholars,
with whose arguments, as far as they go, I fully agree."). Langholm is arguably the most important and
influential recent scholar of the doctrine of just price. In a review of Langholm's 1979 book, Price and
Value in the Aristotelian Tradition: A Study in Scholastic Economic Sources, John W. Baldwin, himself
one of the most influential scholars of medieval theories of just price during the middle of the twentieth
century, concluded that Langholm's book, which was based on an extensive survey of previously
unknown medieval sources, was "the most original and significant contribution to medieval economic
theory to have appeared in the past two decades." John W. Balwin, Review of Price and Value in the
Aristotelian Tradition: A Study in Scholastic Economic Sources by Odd Langholm, 55 SPECULUM 807,
809 (1980).
46. See, e.g., O.F. Hamouda & B.B. Price, The Justice of the Just Price, 4 EUR. J. HiST.
ECON. THOUGHT 191, 208 (1997) (concluding that the medieval schoolmen's "amalgamated discussion
of price from an economic and ethical perspective was much deeper than the modern one, in the sense
that it rendered contemplation of economic technicalities, which are dear to modern economists, of
secondary importance, and reflected on the moral and ethical aspects of market exchange as well as the
notion of 'value', issues whose serious discussion today are simply dismissed on economic grounds
alone"); Adrian Walsh, The Morality ofthe Market and the Medieval Schoolmen, 3 POL. PHIL. ECON. 241,
247 (2004) ("The Theory of the Just Price was an attempt to provide some kind of moral constraints upon
the formation of prices."). But see JAMES DAVIS, MEDIEVAL MARKET MORALITY: LIFE, LAW, AND
ETHICS IN THE ENGLISH MARKETPLACE, 1200-1500, at 62-63 (2012) ("[I]n essence, the just price was
accepted as the market price that both vendor and purchaser were willing to accept, provided that any
deceit, manipulation or coercion has been excised from the deal.").
47. See David D. Friedman, In Defense of Thomas Aquinas and the Just Price, 12 HIST.
POL. ECON. 234, 236 (1980) ("Both the writers in the scholastic tradition and Aristotle, their primary
source, were largely concerned with exchanges involving small numbers of buyers and sellers .... The
purpose of the doctrine of just price was to determine the price in such non-competitive situations.");
George W. Wilson, The Economics of the Just Price, 7 HIST. POL. ECON. 56, 73 (1975) ("The notion of
thejust price was rooted in the quest for stability at a time when existing social forms were changing. But
it was also a product of low per capita levels of output and, as such, was a social and prescriptive device
that attempted to have the needed goods and services produced and distributed in accordance with
prevailing views of equity. In the absence of competitive markets, justice in exchange required some
special social constraints.").
48. LANGHOLM, supra note 40, at 88; see also id. ("The scholastic masters recognized
that, by insisting on an estimate of the price level that might have established itself in the regular
competitive market under normal conditions gust as a normal cost estimate), it was possible, to an
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buyers and sellers, as well as in circumstances of dearth and economic necessity,
the market price did not necessarily reflect the just price. The overriding concern
in all cases was with protecting against the exercise of economic coercion, most
often by sellers against buyers. Most of the actual scholastic cases dealing with
unjust pricing thus involved situations where "strong bargaining positions
[could] be obtained, so that the opposite party (most often a buyer, but sometimes
a seller) [could] be subjected to economic compulsion."49
Looking back at this rather cursory history of the scholastic understanding
of just price, it is clear that efforts to corral the doctrine into a single cost-based
or market-based frame are unlikely to succeed. As the Norwegian economic
historian Odd Langholm argues, moreover, these two dominant interpretations
of just price tended to reflect later ideological divisions within economics rather
than a thorough understanding of the medieval doctrine.50 Based on his extensive
research with primary sources, Langholm concludes that for the medieval writers
the two positions may not have been as contrary as some suggested.5 ' Langholm
also points out in this respect that Schumpeter's view of the just price as the
"normal competitive price" was more nuanced than later commentators realized
and that it could also be reconciled with earlier cost-based interpretations.52 As
discussed in more detail in the next Part, both of these understandings of just
price-cost-based and market-based-have influenced public utility regulation
over the course of the last century.
adequate extent, o reduce economic compulsion, because competition between sellers protects buyers
and vice versa.").
49. Id.
50. Id. at 87 (noting that the supposed opposition between a market interpretation of
just price and a cost interpretation was a product of a much later ideological conflict and that for the
medieval theorists "[c]ost and market were complementary and mutually supporting criteria by which to
reach a reasonable estimate of price by the parties involved, or by the confessors and arbiters, when the
need arose").
51. Id.
52. According to Langholm, what Schumpeter recognized as the "normal competitive
price" was a price that neither buyer nor seller could influence. Accordingly, it was not subject to
manipulation and thus could be assumed to function as the just price. See LANGHOLM, supra note 21, at
32. Unfortunately, various historians writing at mid-century failed to appreciate the nuance of
Schumpeter's analysis and tended to read the just price as the market price without recognizing the
important qualification that this was only in the context of a competitive market operating "under normal
conditions." See id. at 33 (taking issue with DeRoover's and Baldwin's interpretation of just price as
market price and noting that these interpretations were a "distortion" of Schumpeter's view). Langholm
goes on to provide an interpretation of Schumpeter's view of just price that seeks to reconcile it with
alternative "cost-based" approaches to just price:
Schumpeter does not explain what he means here by normal conditions. But one would of course
usually think of it as conditions under which price covers costs. If that is what Schumpeter had
in mind, his whole argument could have been stated in terms of a cost theory. It would run
something like this: Both parties do of course usually profit from mutual exchange, otherwise
they would not exchange. But here is a certain valuation, objective in the sense that it is made
by superpersonal economic forces, in terms of which goods exchanged must be equalized,
namely normal cost, otherwise exchange will break down. Hence the individual buyer and seller
should do nothing, even when this happens to be in their power, to keep price artificially below




What is also clear from the intellectual history of just price and what is
important to emphasize was the general ethical understanding of economic life
that informed conceptions of just price. As a way of regulating prices, just price
was grounded in a broader set of customs and norms within particular
communities. The idea that the economy constituted a sphere of activity separate
from social, political, and ethical relations made little sense.3 During this time
the market operated as a "site of justice," as Michel Foucault put it.54 It had not
yet been transformed into a "site of truth" operating according to "natural" laws
and providing a baseline against which to judge government interventions.
Prices, therefore, were not simply or exclusively economic phenomena; they had
not yet been stripped of social and normative content, but were embedded within
a more general "moral economy. "56
53. See LANGHOLM, supra note 12, at 85 ("The modern mechanistic conception of the
market ... was foreign to the medieval masters. Their frame of reference was a moral universe that obliged
any buyer or seller to act for the common good and agree to terms of exchange accordingly, regardless of
the advantage granted him by the forces of the market. This meant that the common estimate of the just
price could not refer indiscriminately to whatever price might be obtainable under existent market
conditions."); KAULLA, supra note 32, at 19 (describing "the problem of the just price (justum pretium)"
as "the question how the prices of goods should be fixed in order to satisfy men's sense of justice"); see
also Karl Polanyi, The Economy as Instituted Process, in TRADE AND MARKET IN THE EARLY EMPIRES:
ECONOMIES IN HISTORY AND THEORY 250 (Karl Polanyi et al. eds., 1957) ("The human economy ... is
embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and noneconomic. The inclusion of the noneconomic
is vital. For religion or government may be as important to the structure and functioning of the economy
as monetary institutions or the availability of tolls and machines that lighten the toil of labor.").
54. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE
DE FRANCE, 1978-1979, at 30-31 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2008) ("The market, in
the very general sense of the word, as it operated in the Middle Ages, and in the 16th and 17th centuries,
was, in a word, essentially a site of justice .... a place where what had to appear in exchange and be
formulated in the price was justice."). Foucault discusses three aspects of this idea of the market as a site
ofjustice: extensive regulation of the goods brought to market, just price, and sanctions for fraud. Id.
55. Id. at 31 (observing that by the middle of the eighteenth century prior views of the
market as a "site of justice" had given way to a new understanding of the market as "something that
obeyed and had to obey 'natural,' that is to say, spontaneous mechanisms"). According to Foucault, a
general view took hold during this time, marked most prominently by key works in classical political
economy, that these natural mechanisms of the market should be allowed to function unimpeded so as to
produce the "natural" or "normal" price. Id. In this understanding, the market thus becomes a "site of
truth" or "veridiction" and, as such, the basis for assessing the propriety of government interventions:
[W]hat is discovered at this moment, at once in governmental practice and in reflection on this
governmental practice, is that inasmuch as prices are determined in accordance with the natural
mechanisms of the market they constitute a standard of truth which enables us to discern which
governmental practices are correct and which are erroneous. In other words, it is the natural
mechanism of the market and the formation of a natural price that enables us to falsify and verify
governmental practice when, on the basis of these elements, we examine what he government
does, the measures it takes, and the rules it imposes.
Id.
56. Not all professional economists embraced the abstract, disembedded notion of the
price system at the heart of much of classical and neoclassical economics. See, e.g., Joan Robinson, Some
Reflections on the Philosophy ofPrices, 26 MANCHESTER SCH. ECON. & SOC. STUDS. 116, 135 (1958)
("Ever since Adam Smith economists have been looking for a simple general theory of prices to fit all
cases. The foregoing is intended to show that this is a will o' the wisp. Prices are a social phenomenon
and the pricing system in any economy is geared to it social and political system.").
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C. Moral Economy
This idea of a moral economy, it should be emphasized, is not intended in
a prescriptive sense. Rather, it is used here as a descriptive term to capture the
pervasive role of customs, norms, and values in regulating economic behavior in
various times and places. As such, the term has most often been used to describe
economies that are not thoroughly dominated by market exchange, with
particular attention to the role of customary practices in governing access to
necessities such as grain during times of scarcity and dearth. Of course, as
Marion Fourcade and other economic sociologists remind us, "all economies are
moral economies" and need to be analyzed as such. Some economies and
economic relationships, however, are more overtly normative than others in
terms of the manner in which custom, tradition, and values are mobilized in the
regulation or governance of economic activity. And it is in this sense that the
term moral economy is used here.
This particular notion of moral economy, including its relation to ideas of
just price, was employed to great effect by E.P. Thompson in his work on food
riots in eighteenth century England. As articulated by Thompson, the moral
economy of the crowd incorporated the idea of just price as a customary practice
of establishing fairness in market exchange and regulating the prices of food and
other necessities during times of dearth.58 Arguing against what he characterized
as the "spasmodic" view of food riots and the tendency to relegate the crowd to
a marginal, almost Pavlovian role in history (stimulus: hunger; response: food
riot),59 Thompson showed how food riots were in fact driven by an older,
normative conception of economic exchange and the idea that necessities uch
57. Marion Fourcade, The Fly and the Cookie: Alignment and Unhingement in 21"
Century Capitalism, 15 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 661, 665 (2017) ("[AIll economies are moral economies: all
differentiate and hierarchize between good and bad, high and low, legitimate or illegitimate, and the
market economy is no exception. Correlatively, holding on to the view that this rise of market culture
necessarily undermines the moral terrain prevents us from truly engaging with the complexities of the
relationship between the two, as well as the complexity of the social struggles at stake."); id. at 662 ("The
economy is morally thick, and it must be analyzed as such.").
58. E.P. Thompson, The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth
Century, 50 PAST & PRESENT 76, 108 (1971) ("What is remarkable about these 'insurrections' is, first,
their discipline, and, second, the fact that they exhibit a pattern of behavior for whose origin we must look
back several hundred years: which becomes more, rather than less, sophisticated in the eighteenth century;
which repeats itself, seemingly spontaneously, in different parts of the country and after the passage of
many quiet years. The central action in this pattern is not the sack of the granaries and the pilfering of
grain or flour but the action of 'setting the price."'); see also DAVIS, supra note 46, at 447 ("The precepts
of the moral economy accepted that just prices were those determined by supply and demand and
middlemen and bakers had a right to profit. What they did not have a right to do was undertake practices
that caused harm to their fellows in the search for the best profits . . . . It was not an ideology that was in
conflict with the market, but it was a belligerent popular ethic that could not adapt to the new laissez-faire
policies of the late eighteenth century that sought to erode traditional paternal notions.").
59. Thompson, supra note 58, at 76 (discussing the "spasmodic view ofpopular history"





as grain had a just price that sometimes departed from prices set in the markets.60
Riots, and the plausible threat of riots, thus drew on older paternalistic
relationships and norms to enforce (to regulate) the price of grain during times
of scarcity.6 1
Much of the concern here was with manipulative practices on the part of
sellers. The poor were not hostile to competitive markets according to
Thompson; indeed, their protests and riots were directed at episodes when
markets were not working when merchants and others seemed to be taking
unfair advantage of consumers.62 The riots targeted these practices and sought to
restore prices to what was considered the just or fair price.63
Thompson's notion of moral economy, with its grounding in ideas of just
price, has proved quite wide-ranging in its influence on scholars writing about
other times and places.64 Social scientists studying peasant communities around
the world, for example, have employed the concepts of moral economy and just
price to understand how customary practices and norms erve to regulate
60. Id. at 131-32 ("It is not easy for us to conceive that there may have been a time,
within a smaller and more integrated community, when it appeared to be 'unnatural' that any man should
profit from the necessities of others, and when it was assumed that, in time of dearth, prices of 'necessities'
should remain at a customary level, even though there might be less all around.").
61. Id. at 107-15 (discussing specific food riots and their role in setting the price of
grain during times of scarcity); see also id. at 120-26 (discussing how the threat of riots also served to
regulate the price of necessities).
62. Id. at 112 ("It is the restraint rather than the disorder, which is remarkable; and there
can be no doubt that the actions were approved by an overwhelming popular consensus. There is a deeply-
felt conviction that prices ought, in times of dearth, to be regulated, and that the profiteer put himself
outside of society."); E.P. THOMPSON, MORAL ECONOMIC REVIEWED IN CUSTOMS IN COMMON: STUDIES
IN TRADITIONAL POPULAR CULTURE 304-05 (1991) ("[E]ven the most zealous food rioters ... were
inextricably committed to the market, both as producers and as consumers. How could they have existed
for a month or a week without it? . . . It is with the special case of the marketing of 'necessities' in times
of dearth that we have been concerned, and the crowd's preferred model was precisely the 'open market'
in which petty producers freely competed, rather than the closed market when large dealers conducted
private barhains over samples in the back parlours of inns."); see also KARL GUNNAR PERSSON, GRAIN
MARKETS IN EUROPE, 1500-1900: INTEGRATION AND DEREGULATION 41 (1999) (arguing against those
who mistakenly interpreted Thompson's notion of moral economy as antithetical to markets and positing
instead that "the moral economy and furore of the crowd was aroused by poor market performance and
periodic marketfailures").
63. See THOMPSON, supra note 62, at 304-05; see also DAVIS, supra note 46, at 440-47
(providing further support for Thompson's argument that the moral economy of the English crowd in the
eighteenth century drew on earlier notions ofjust price and Medieval market morality).
64. For general overviews of the history and spread of moral economy as an idea, see
James G. Carrier, Moral Economy: What's in a Name, 2017 ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1 (2017);
Johann Simeant, Three Bodies ofMoral Economy: The Diffusion ofa Concept, 11 J. GLOBAL ETHICS 163
(2015); Norbert Gotz, "Moral Economy ": Its Conceptual History andAnalyticalProspects, 11 J. GLOBAL
ETHICS 147 (2015). Tim Rogan's recent book, THE MORAL ECONOMISTS: R. H. TAWNEY, KARL POLANYI,
E. P. THOMPSON, AND THE CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM (2017), takes Thompson's work as one of its key
subjects in an effort to recover a more general moral critique of capitalism as a complement to what he
refers to as the current "material" critique focused largely on inequality. But Rogan focuses primarily on
Thompson's earlier book, The Making of the English Working Class, rather than his work on the moral
economy of the crowd and, as a result, ends up with an overly sentimental reading of Thompson's notion
of moral economy. As Thompson himself noted in his 1991 assessment of the moral economy literature,
his earlier "anti-capitalist" use of the term in The Making of the English Working Class was defined more
carefully and in a manner that rejected any sort of sentimental attachment o the term and the practices it
was meant to capture. See THOMPSON, supra note 62, at 336-44.
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economic exchange and to protect against subsistence crises.6 5 As in
Thompson's work, moreover, these notions of moral economy are not intended
to signal any sort of sentimental or romantic attachment to "traditional"
economies.6 6 Quite the contrary, in fact. Moral economy and just price always
operated within the context of existing power relations and class conflict, serving
chiefly to regulate the provisioning of necessities in order to maintain social
order.67
The considerable body of historical research on grain markets in Europe
prior to the nineteenth century, particularly in France with its police des grains,
reinforces such a view, illustrating the role of both customary practices and
formal rules in regulating exchange and ensuring a just price for necessities uch
as grain.6 8 The ideas ofjust price at work in this context, moreover, were not tied
to any particular doctrine or approach. They varied over time and space,
representing a pragmatic response to the demands of social order and stability.69
65. See, e.g., JAMES C. SCOTT, THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE PEASANT: REBELLION
AND SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 163-65 (1976) (discussing concept of just price as a component
of moral consensus regarding fair exchange and as a means of maintaining subsistence among peasant
communities in Southeast Asia).
66. See MICHAEL J. WATTS, SILENT VIOLENCE: FOOD, FAMINE, AND PEASANTRY IN
NORTHERN NIGERIA 146 (1983) ("There is no need in political economic analysis to glorify what is long
gone. Equally there is no need to saddle the moral economy with the legacy of Durkheim, Rousseau, and
Ruskin .... [T]o evoke the moral economy is not to conjure up a perfectly calibrated social machinery
that guaranteed survival."); see also Thompson, supra note 62, at 341-43 (discussing the use of moral
economy by Scott, Watts, and others in the field ofpeasant studies).
67. See THOMPSON, supra note 62, at 343 (discussing moral economy in the context of
a "field of force . . . and in the bargaining between unequal social forces in which the weaker still has
acknowledged claims among the greater"); WATTS, supra note 66, at 109 ("The moral economy [of Hausa
peasants in northern Nigeria] was not especially moral and the Caliphate was certainly no Rousseauian
universe of peasant welfare and benevolent patrons. Rather, the moral economy was necessary to the
survival of ruler and ruled, and the price was paid by prevailing power blocs for the maintenance and
reproduction of the social relations of production replete with its exploitative relations and class
struggles.")
68. See STEVEN L. KAPLAN, BREAD, POLITICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE REIGN
OF LOUIS THE XV 58-59 (1976) ("In almost every monopoly arraignment, the police accused the
merchant(s) of 'illicitly,' 'illegitimately,' or 'criminally' forcing prices up .... When merchants drove
the price above a certain level, which varied in time and space and epended upon such factors as the
ordinary price and wage scale, the elasticity of demand, and the likelihood of harvest recovery, they
wronged the whole society. Implicit in the notion of monopoly and stemming from the moralistic tradition
was the idea of a 'just price.' Lieutenants general of police, commissaries, inspectors, grain measurers and
local officials repeatedly invoked the 'just price' which they construed as their obligation to assure. Their
conception was a relativistic and empirical one which sprang from no coherent theory of social or
commutative justice. The just price was a price which would neither 'disgust' merchants nor 'wound'
consumers. It was predicated upon an ideal of moderation which tended to vary with the circumstances.
A price was thought just when merchants settled for a moderate profit and the bulk of the people, who
lived in a state of chronic misery, did not suffer immoderately, that is to say, more than they did usually.");
see also BERNARD HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF
NATURAL ORDER 18-19 (2011) (noting that during the eighteenth century the police des grains were
viewed not as sources of excessive intervention in a free market (a position that Adam Smith would later
take) but as a means of enhancing liberty through their protection of a system of provisioning that was
crucial to everyday life).
69. KAPLAN, supra note 68, at 59 ("In untroubled moments the just price was simply
the current price (as the theologians had recommended), fixed by common estimation rather than imposed
by merchant maneuvers or governmental fiat. In a dearth, which grotesquely distorted standards of
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In discussing the regulation of the grain trade in old-regime France, for example,
Steven Kaplan emphasized the special obligations that attended the provisioning
of necessities:
The rules developed to govern the grain trade were based upon the tenet that grain
was essentially unlike any other commodity commonly exchanged and thus must
be treated differently. As an item of 'first necessity' and ultimately a matter of
life or death for millions of consumers, grain could not be legitimately compared
with goods whose exchange merely complemented subsistence or enhanced
pleasure .... Given its special nature, those who undertook to deal in grain, the
police believed, assumed solemn responsibilities toward society.7
0
As Kaplan observed, "the police viewed the [grain] trade as a kind of public
service."" Accordingly, they imposed certain restrictions on grain merchants
that did not apply to others.72 A grain merchant "had to be satisfied with a 'just
and legitimate gain' based upon his investment, his labor, and the energy with
which he served the public rather than on the cunning with which he manipulated
supply and demand factors."73 In effect, the grain trade operated as a common
infrastructure for society a key system of provisioning not unlike more modem
forms of public utility that demanded careful regulation.74
To be sure, it was precisely these rules governing the grain trade that Adam
Smith singled out for criticism in his famous digression on the com trade in the
Wealth ofNations. As Smith argued, efforts to control the price of grain, even
and especially in times of dearth, stemmed from prejudice and superstition rather
than a proper understanding of political economy.76 As for the prospect that a
moderation, the just price became much more difficult to define .... For many authorities the just price
now became the price of social stability, the price that would still be accessible to the majority of the
population. In the midst of a crisis, few administrators believed that the just price could be attained without
some form of government intervention.").
70. Id. 52-53.
71. Id. at 53.
72. Id. (the police "made demands and imposed restrictions upon grain traders which
other merchants escaped").
73. Id.
74. Id. ("Implicit in the police conception of the grain trade was the notion that the grain
held by a merchant (or cultivator) was not perfectly and exclusively his own to dispose of as he saw fit.
As the primary source of subsistence, grain was a 'common good' upon which society had certain
claims.").
75. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 490-510 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (digression concerning the corn trade and the corn laws);
see also HARCOURT, supra note 68, at 7 ("It was precisely this maze of ordinances that Adam Smith, in
the Wealth of Nations, castigated as 'such absurd regulations, as frequently aggravate the unavoidable
misfortune of a dearth, into the dreadful calamity of a famine."').
76. SMITH, supra note 75, at 507 ("The laws concerning corn may everywhere be
compared to the laws concerning religion. The people feel themselves so much interested in what relates
either to their subsistence in this life, or to their happiness in a life to come, that government must yield
to their prejudices, and, in order to preserve the public tranquility, establish the system which they approve
of. It is upon this account, perhaps, that we so seldom fund a reasonable system established with regard
to either of these two capital objects.").
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dearth might turn into a full-fledged famine, Smith argued that prices should be
allowed to rise in order to discourage consumption and call forth more
production." Government intervention would only make matters worse. In fact,
according to Smith, government intervention was the true underlying cause of
famine: "a famine has never arisen from any other cause but the violence of
government attempting, by improper means, to remedy the inconveniences of a
dearth."" As Smith elaborated, in what surely constitutes one of the more pivotal
interventions on behalf of classical political economy's embrace of free markets:
When the government, in order to remedy the inconveniences of dearth, orders
all the dealers to sell their corn at what it supposes a reasonable price, it either
hinders them from bringing it to market, which may sometimes produce a famine
even in the beginning of the season; or if they bring it thither, it enables the people,
and thereby encourages them to consume it so fast, as must necessarily produce a
famine before the end of the season. The unlimited, unrestrained freedom of the
corn trade, as it is the only effectual preventative of the miseries of a famine, so
it is the best palliative of the inconveniences of a dearth; for the inconveniences
of a real scarcity cannot be remedied; they can only be palliated. No trade deserves
more the full protection of the law, and no trade requires it so much; because no
trade is so much exposed to popular odium.79
For Adam Smith, then, the invocation of customary notions of just price as a
means of regulating market prices was a product of popular prejudice. If
enforced, it was virtually guaranteed to make things worse. Left to its own
devices, the market would allow prices to rise and fall as supply and demand
dictated, thereby serving to ration consumption and palliate the "inconveniences
of dearth."o
77. Id. at 490-92.
78. Id. at 492-93. Two generations of research on various famines throughout history
and around the world beg to differ. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON
ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION 160-62 (1981) (demonstrating that Smith's notion that unimpeded
markets were the best remedy for famines does not hold in the case of actual famines); MIKE DAVIS, LATE
VICTORIAN HOLOCAUSTS: EL NINO FAMINES AND THE MAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 31 (2001) ("By
official dictate, India like Ireland before it had become a Utilitarian laboratory where millions of lives
were wagered against dogmatic faith in omnipotent markets overcoming the 'inconvenience of dearth."').
79. SMITH, supra note 75, at 493. More recent historical treatments of Smith have
sought to recover his broader moral sensibilities, questioning the overly simplistic portrait of Smith as an
uncritical evangelist for free markets. While this is not the place to engage in a debate over Smith's larger
corpus of work, suffice it to say that his remarks on the corn trade and dearth exerted a profound and
highly destructive influence on government responses to food shortages and famine across the British
Empire. See THOMPSON, supra note 62, at 279 (noting that "the few pages of Smith's digression on the
corn trade ... acquired oracular authority, and in each episode of scarcity in Britain in 1795 and 1800,
in Ireland, India, and the Colonial Empire through much of the nineteenth century these were the
arguments which politicians and administrators rehearsed"); id., at 282 ("These pages, then, were among
the most influential writings in history, with a global influence which was sometimes baneful. Their
arguments discredited or disallowed traditional protective interventions in times of dearth, could be used
to justify profiteering and hoarding, and could serve as apologetics to soothe the troubled consciences of
the authorities by commending inactivity as correct political economy.").
80. SMITH, supra note 75, at 483.
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But this idea of rationing by price obscured the "real relationship assigned
by price."8 ' "Rationing by price," Thompson argued, "does not allocate
resources equally among those in need; it reserves the supply to those who can
pay the price and excludes those who can't."8 2 No matter how logical or natural
Smith's arguments appeared to be, they failed to recognize that as much as one-
fourth of the English population in the eighteenth century "rubbed along on the
edge of bare subsistence, and was in danger of falling below this whenever prices
rose."83 While high prices might not matter to the rich and might bring only
inconvenience or modest pain to the middle and working classes, they could
threaten the very survival of the poor.84 In sum, "Smithian advocacy of free trade
in grain [may have] had evident virtues in the long run," but it "had only negative
relevance in times of crisis, since his remedies-such as increasing cereal
production were long-run remedies or such as very high prices were not
remedies at all."
Thompson's critique of Smith's views of famine and dearth, along with his
efforts to recover a history of the customary norms of moral economy that were
giving way in the face of laissez faire also underscores an important and more
general shift in the meaning of price. For classical political economy, the idea of
a natural, self-regulating economic order offered limited room for the earlier
understanding of price as a relationship that was central to the idea of just price.
Going forward, prices were increasingly shorn of broader normative content and
reduced to economic facts-residual products of the anonymous forces of supply
and demand at work in the market.
It is important to emphasize here (again) that for Thompson and his fellow
travelers, moral economy and just price had specific meanings tied to a specific
set of circumstances, namely the trade in economic necessities such as grain,
especially in times of dearth. Unlike the trade in other goods and services, these
systems of provisioning were too important to be left solely to the market. Price
regulation, whether enforced by the crowd or by public authorities, was widely
viewed as a necessary means for maintaining social stability. In these situations,
at the very least, high prices were not simply market signals that would ration
consumption in the short run and call forth more production over the longer term.
They also constituted and determined the terms of access to basic economic
necessities. This special attention to necessities, as we will see, was particularly
relevant to the modern conception of public utility that began to take shape at the
end of the nineteenth century, underscoring arguments in favor of regulation that
would ensure access at reasonable prices.




85. Id. at 283.
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Since Thompson wrote, ideas of moral economy and just price have been
extended beyond the circumstances of dearth and necessities to a wide range of
economic activities and relationships. Morton Horwitz, for example, draws on
Thompson's work in arguing that the "equitable" conception of contract that
prevailed in America prior to the commercial transformation of the nineteenth
century was grounded in medieval notions of just price.86 Similarly, P.S. Atiyah
identified just price as one of the "relics of medieval thought" that influenced
basic understandings of contractual exchange and markets in England during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries." Like Thompson, Atiyah stressed the role
of custom and just price in regulating certain kinds of markets and protecting
consumers against the abuses of monopoly."
Such commitments, moreover, were hardly limited to the Anglo-American
tradition.89 In her work on the French merchant courts and commercial life in
eighteenth century France, for example, Amalia Kessler finds that contrary to the
established view that just price no longer had any real bite by the eighteenth
century, evidence from actual court records regarding a range of contract
disputes demonstrated that "failure to pay a just price did indeed remain an
actionable claim in the eighteenth century at least in the Parisian merchant
court."90 Likewise, contract law in Germany prior to codification in the late
nineteenth century bore the imprint ofjust price and the related doctrine of laesio
86. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 917, 935 (1974) (characterizing the equitable conception of contract in eighteenth century
America as a "remnant of the medieval just price theory of value"). But see A.W.B Simpson, The Horwitz
Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 536-38 (1979) (criticizing Horwitz's
invocation of "just price" and his broader equitable conception of contract as overly romantic and out of
synch with the prevailing view of just price as the market price). The Horwitz thesis has continued to
garner a fair amount of attention and controversy. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Morton Horwitz and His
Critics: A Conflict ofNarratives, 37 TULSA L. REV. 915, 918-19 (2002) (summarizing the key points of
the dispute between Simpson and Horwitz and referencing James Oldham's conclusion based on a survey
of the controversy that the "great majority" of cases supported the Horwitz view).
87. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 61-65 (1979)
(discussing medieval notions of just price and their influence on eighteenth century understandings of
contractual exchange and markets).
88. Id. at 65 ("It is enough here to stress that if the older traditions about just prices
were now (or perhaps even if they had always been) subject to market influences, it was quite clear that
they did presuppose a certain type of market. They presupposed the absence of monopoly. They
presupposed that the supply of foodstuffs, especially, should be open and above board; there should be no
hoarding, no holding up the public to ransom in times of harvest failure. What was available for sale must
indeed be made available, openly, and to customers before dealers. It was thus not so much a free market
as a regulated market, and the regulation was largely in the interests of the consumers.").
89. Durkheim, of course, wrote extensively about he "morals of contractual relations"
and the idea of just exchange. See EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 211
(Cornelia Brookfield trans., 1957) ("A just contract is not simply any contract that is freely consented to,
that is, without explicit coercion; it is a contract by which things and services are exchanged at the true
and normal value, in short, at the just value."). For a broader historical investigation of notions of equality
in exchange and their connection to ideas of just price, see James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 1587 (1991).
90. See AMALIA D. KESSLER, A REVOLUTION IN COMMERCE: THE PARISIAN





enormis, which provided for rescission of certain contracts (notably for land) in
cases of inadequate price.9'
Perhaps most relevant for this Essay, the doctrine of just price also exerted
a powerful influence on American economic thought and policy well into the
nineteenth century. In colonial America, for example, "the bulk of the early value
discussion," according to one historian, "centres [sic] around an economic ideal
inherited from medieval economic philosophy: the idea of a 'just price."'92
Likewise, the extensive price controls enacted by various authorities during the
91. See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and
German Law, 11 TUL. L. REV. 345, 364-76 (1937) (discussing history ofjustprice and laesio enormis and
their influence on French and German contract law); Friedrich Kessler, Some Thoughts on the Evolution
ofthe German Law of Contracts-A Comparative Study: Part 1, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1066, 1074-80 (1975)
(discussing notion of contractual justice in German contract law). More generally, despite the strong
historical trend away from equitable theories of contract during the nineteenth century, the residual
influence ofjust price could (and can) still be found in various contract law doctrines intended to protect
vulnerable parties from economic coercion. The doctrine of unconscionability in both civil and common
law traditions, for example, has been identified as stemming from earlier notions of just price. See, e.g.,
Andrea Perrone, The Just Price and Contemporary Contract Law: Some Introductory Remarks, 2 RIVISTA
INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI 217, 218 (2014) ("Usury laws, the remedies provided for gross
disparity by contract law in Continental Europe, and the doctrine of unconscionability in North American
common law are clear signs of a persisting principle of equality in exchange which can be traced back to
the doctrine of just price."); Alphonse M. Squillante, Unconscionability: French, German, Anglo-
American Application, 34 ALB. L. REV. 297, 313 (1970) ("If one analyzes the history of unconscionability
he arrives at the conclusion that the history of laesio enormis and just price is indeed the history of
unconscionability."); MACPHERSON, supra note 21, at 14 (observing that he idea of commutative justice
reappears in contemporary doctrines of unconscionability in contract law and in various strands of
consumer protection legislation); see also United States v. Bethlehem Steel, 315 U.S 289, 326 (1942)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Fraud and physical duress are not the only grounds upon which courts refuse
to enforce contracts. The law is not so primitive that it sanctions every injustice except brute force and
downright fraud. More specifically, the courts generally refuse to lend themselves to the enforcement of
a 'bargain' in which one party has unjustly taken advantage of the economic necessities of the other. And
there is great reason and justice in this rule, for necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men, but, to
answer a present exigency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them." (quotations
omitted)). Seana Shiffrin has argued against paternalist understandings of the unconscionability doctrine
that focus on the protection of the weaker party, arguing instead that courts' (and the broader
community's) unwillingness to be complicit in the enforcement of contracts that are grossly unfair lie
outside of our accommodation duties. Such a position suggests a more fundamental commitment to
preserving fairness and equality in exchange-one that echoes earlier notions ofjust price as grounded in
the community's estimation of the contours of fair exchange. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism,
Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 205, 227-30, 245-50 (2000).
92. E.A.J. JOHNSON, AMERICAN ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
123 (1932). "The concept [ofjust price]," Johnson continued,
stands at the root and stem of the value discussion, while from it proceed, as first exfoliations,
the complaints about 'oppression' in prices and the demands for legislative control of markets.
But the colonial discussion, lacking the uniformity of the medieval thought from which it
borrowed its seed, could not retain the harmony and completeness of the medieval economic
doctrine. The thoughts of practical colonists are never those of monastic theologians, and as a
consequence, the medieval value legacy at the hands of the seventeenth-century Americans was
modified and amplified rather than crystalized around the concept of "just price."
Id.; see also BERNARD BAILYN, THE NEw ENGLAND MERCHANTS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 20-21
(1955) ("The soul of the merchant was constantly exposed to sin by virtue of his control of goods
necessary to other people. Since proof of the diligence he applied in his calling was in the profits he made
from precisely such exchanges, could a line be drawn between industry and avarice? The Puritans
answered, as had the Catholics for half a millennium, that it could and they designated this line the 'just
price."').
747
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 35, 2018
colonial era were founded upon the concept, drawing as they did on the long
history of governmental price controls in England that were themselves inspired
by just price.93
John Cotton's "rules of trading" part of the code of laws he proposed for
Massachusetts in 1639-offered what was perhaps "the most concise statement
of the doctrine of 'just price."'94 Arguing against the notion that "a man might
sell as dear as he can, and buy as cheap as he can," Cotton defined just price
as the price which would be paid by a buyer who 'knows the worth of the
commodity' and whose demand for the commodity was such, that he had use for
it but was under no economic compulsion to buy. The seller of goods must
therefore determine a 'just price' by means of the fiction of an intelligent,
uncoerced buyer.
95
The overarching concern here was not with keeping prices low but rather with
preventing compulsion in economic exchange. Early colonial governments thus
adopted price-fixing statutes for a wide range of goods and services, drawing
directly on older notions of just price.96 One Georgia statute from the mid-
93. See James W. Ely, Jr., Economic Liberties and the Original Meaning of the
Constitution, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 673, 681 (2008) ("Colonial lawmakers also adopted pervasive
schemes of price regulation, covering the sale of a wide range of products. Such legislation harked back
to the medieval notion of a just price, under which considerations of fairness and customary pricing could
trump the right to charge market prices. Price controls reflected thinking molded by an economy of
scarcity."). Ely goes on to note, moreover, that "[n]ot only did pricing controls reach a large variety of
commodities, but price regulations persisted longer than those governing wages." Id; see also JONATHAN
R. T. HUGHES, THE GOVERNMENTAL HABIT REDUX: ECONOMIC CONTROLS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO
THE PRESENT 39 (1991) ("Two medieval concepts, the prohibition of usury and the doctrine of ajust price,
were imbedded in the general colonial aws .... The idea that a price different from the market price
might be just lay behind colonial price controls. These were generally applied in special situations and
ordinarily in connection with quality controls of public-service enterprises. Indeed, the absence of
attempted price controls by public officials would have been novel in the colonial era."). These colonial
price controls were part of a much longer history, of course. The English Assizes of Bread and Ale and
the Statute of Laborers, for example, drew "heavily upon scholastic notions of the just price." See Davis,
supra note 46, at 223 ("The most significant national regulations for price control were the assizes of
bread and ale, tied to the market price and drawing heavily upon scholastic notions of the just price.");
Henry Rottschaefer, The Field of Governmental Price Control, 35 YALE L.J. 438, 438 (1926)
("Governmental price regulation was practiced at an early stage in English legal history and constituted
an important element in the economic life of the Middle Ages. It was an integral part of a social order
strongly influenced by ethical conceptions of a just price capable of the same kind of objective
determination as any other ethical standard."); Eugene A. Gilmore, Governmental Regulation of Prices,
17 GREEN BAG 627, 627 (1905) (tracing laws regulating prices in England and the United States back to
the doctrine of just price).
94. JOHNSON, supra note 92, at 123.
95. Id at 125-26; see also JOHN COTTON, AN ABSTRACT OF THE LAWS OF NEW
ENGLAND 10 (Paules Chain, London 1641) ("To the intent that all oppression in buying and selling may
be avoided, it shall be lawful for the Judges in every Towne, with the consent of the free Burgesses to
appoint certain select men, to set reasonable rates upon all commodities, and proportionally to limit the
wages of workmen and labourers, and the rates agreed upon by them, and ratified by the Judges, to bind
all the Inhabitants of the Towne. The like course to be taken by the Governor, and Assistants, for the rating
of prices throughout the Country, and all to be confirmed if need be by the general Court."); BAILYN,
supra note 92, at 21 (discussing Cotton's principles of just price).
96. Hughes, supra note 93, at 39.
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eighteenth century even "contained the actual medieval words, enjoining
merchants against 'forestalling, engrossing, and unjust exactions."'9 7
According to the standard account, however, these early colonial price
controls soon gave way to a strong counter-trend in favor of unrestrained
markets.8 The gathering strength of laissez faire, marked by an emerging
ideology of economic individualism and the concept of a natural, self-regulating
market, reinforced these trends trends to which the Lochner Court would soon
grant constitutional license.9 9 In a world increasingly oriented toward liberty of
contract and protection of private property, the idea of just price and its practical
application in government price controls seemed wildly out of place.
But the advance of laissez faire in nineteenth century America has been
shown to be a bit too clean and simple. As William Novak, in particular, has
demonstrated, ideas of "public economy" and the "well-ordered market"
underwrote a wide variety of economic and social regulations during this time,
all of which reflected a deeper concern with directing economic activity in a
manner that would enhance "the people's welfare." too Like Thompson's moral
economy, Novak's public economy was rooted in "a vision of economic relations
subject to the larger dictates of community and social mores."'0' In contrast to
Thompson's story, however, Novak stresses how these commitments to public
economy in America were not "extralegal" but rather "firmly rooted in law and
legislation" and directed at ensuring that markets functioned properly within a
"well-regulated society."102 As Novak has argued in more recent work,
moreover, these broad notions of public economy and the people's welfare
provided the seedbed out of which the modem idea of public utility emerged in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.103
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 92, at 128-29 (noting the trend away from price
fixing during the late colonial period); see also id. at 129-30 (providing a discussion of ideas ofjust price
in early New England legislation (much of it tied to notions of cost)).
99. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
100. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 83-88 (1996).
101. Id. at 112.
102. Id. at 87,95-105 (discussing the emergence ofpublic markets in nineteenth century
America and their extensive regulation). Although Novak does not identify any specific references to
medieval notions ofjust price in his survey of these early forms of market regulation, his characterization
of such regulations seems very much in keeping with the basic idea. See id. at 96 ("American public
markets, like their Roman and English predecessors, were created to ensure an adequate supply of
wholesome, fairly priced food and provisions accessible to the general population .... To leave
unregulated something as central to the general welfare as the supply of basic foodstuffs was an abdication
of public responsibility. Consequently, nineteenth-century states and municipalities used their police
powers to construct regulated marketplaces to protect their populations from high prices, unhealthy goods,
unsanitary conditions, fraud and cheating, and the adverse effects of simple profiteering by hucksters,
forestallers, middle-men, and other second hand sellers.").
103. See Novak, supra note 8, at 158 (discussing "movement from "older ideas ofsalus
populi, people's welfare, and res publica beyond the particular confines of customary, common law, and
ancient constitutional categories toward a broader and more modern conception of general regulation in
the public interest" that found its most important legal expression in the concept of public utility).
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II. Public Utility
One does not have to travel far from these conceptions of just price, moral
economy, and the people's welfare to get to late nineteenth and early twentieth
century conceptions of public utility in the United States. With Munn v. Illinois,
the Supreme Court held that states could use their police powers to regulate
prices charged by "businesses affected with public interest"04 -setting in
motion a train of doctrinal and conceptual developments that culminated in the
modem idea of public utility.0 5 Throughout the course of this development,
price regulation in the public interest drew upon deeper intuitions regarding just
price and fair exchange. As these commitments were absorbed into public utility
regulation, they were gradually formalized and subjected to the dictates of
administration and technical expertise-a process that sometimes resulted in
great confusion.
This Part discusses these developments. It argues that the idea of just price
lay at the core of Munn's approval of price regulation in the public interest and
that it provided the animating force behind the fundamental concern in public
utility law with protecting consumers from the harm that resulted from unfair
exchange. As this Part also demonstrates, however, notions of just price soon
became intertwined with the difficult task of determining how to regulate
prices-that is, how to set rates for public utilities. Here, as we will see, efforts
to determine the "fair value" of a utility's assets for purposes of ratemaking
focused attention on the other side of the bargain (the owners and investors in
the public utility) to ensure that their property was not subject to confiscation.
For more than fifty years, the so-called fair value rule, first articulated in Smyth
v. Ames (1898), plunged utility commissions, courts, and commentators into a
mind-boggling and seemingly endless series of debates over the proper approach
to valuation of utility assets for setting rates. Not until the Hope Natural Gas
case in 1944 did the Supreme Court finally correct the error it had made with the
fair value rule, embracing a new test for "just and reasonable" rates that focused
on the end result of the ratemaking exercise rather than the methodology
employed. This Part closes with a discussion of Hope and its recognition that the
task of rate regulation-of ensuring just and reasonable rates was largely a
technical exercise best left to administrative agencies.
A. Public Interest
The modem notion of public interest got its first airing in Justice Waite's
majority opinion in Munn v. Illinois. Lifting a long dormant phrase from Lord
Mathew Hale's seventeenth century treatise on seaports De Portibus Maris-
104. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
105. See Novak, supra note 8, at 170 ("[I]t is not too much of a stretch to suggest that




the Court held in Munn that state legislatures could use their police powers to
establish rates for those businesses "affected with a public interest."106 As
Walton Hamilton pointed out, the phrase itself contained no test or standard for
legislative price fixing. 07 At best, a new "doctrine of public interest" could be
found "only in embryo" in the Munn decision.10 But the basic idea of regulation
in the public interest and, specifically, of fixing prices for certain businesses in
order to protect the public, found its modem incarnation in Munn.109
For the next half century, legislatures and courts struggled to define the
boundaries of a category of businesses that were sufficiently "affected" or
"clothed" with the public interest so as to merit regulation. Over time, the effort
met with increasingly stiff resistance from various members of the Court, most
notably Justice Holmes who argued that "the notion that a business is clothed
with a public interest and has been devoted to the public use is little more than a
fiction intended to beautify what is disagreeable to the sufferers."10 "The truth
seems to me," Justice Holmes continued, "that, subject to compensation when
compensation is due, the legislature may forbid or restrict any business when it
has sufficient force of public opinion behind it.""' With its 1934 decision in
Nebbia v. New York, a majority of the Supreme Court finally agreed with
Holmes, holding that there was no closed category of businesses "affected with
a public interest" and that legislatures were free to move forward in regulating
businesses as long as they had a rational basis for doing so." 2
It is a mistake, however, to see Munn and its progeny as primarily an
exercise in taxonomy that came to an end with Nebbia.113 As John Commons
106. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); see also Walton Hamilton, Affectation with
a Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089, 1092-99 (1930) (discussing the history of Lord Hale's phrase and
its adoption by the Court in Munn).
107. Hamilton, supra note 106, at 1094 ("But, with whatever meaning historical
scholarship may endow the phrase, it is clear that here is no 'test' for legislative price-fixing . . . . It is
quite impossible to find in Lord Hale's sentences a standard by which is to be measured a price regulation
whose legality and economic soundness had not been questioned; or to discover there a limit to legislative
discretion in a country in which even to this day Parliament decides for itself how far it may go in the
control of industry."); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & HENRY M. HART, JR., RATE REGULATION IN THE
CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO A CURRENT ISSUE OF PUBLIC POLICY
5 (Paul W. MacAvoy ed., 1970) ("The words themselves are palpably empty.").
108. Hamilton, supra note 106, at 1096.
109. Novak, supra note 8.
110. Tyson & Brothers v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934) ("It is clear that there is no closed
class or category of businesses affected with a public interest . . . . The phrase 'affected with a public
interest' can, in the nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject
to control for the public good."); see also BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ
FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 175 (1998) ("After Nebbia, the
Court never again interfered with a legislature's decision about which enterprises were regulable.")
113. The substantial historical literature on Munn tends to see the opinion, and the
doctrinal developments that ensued, as a conservative move by the Court to separate public and private
and limit price-fixing legislation to specific categories of businesses. See, e.g., HARRY N. SCHEIBER, THE
ROAD TO MUNN: EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC PURPOSE IN THE STATE COURTS 330-
31 (1971) (noting that Munn was not so much a new beginning as it was a culmination of a line of cases
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pointed out, the real significance of Munn lay in the Court's recognition that
changing economic conditions can create new possibilities for economic
coercion."4 The grain elevators at issue in Munn were not legal monopolies-
they did not enjoy an exclusive franchise from the government that would have
required them to submit to price regulation."5 But because they stood at the very
gateway of the Chicago grain trade, they constituted a "virtual monopoly" that
gave them the ability to exact unfair gains from their customers by charging
higher prices."6 The Illinois legislation at issue in Munn, like the Granger laws
in other states, was enacted to prevent such coercion by setting maximum
prices."'
In the absence of governmental power to fix reasonable charges, the Munn
Court found, the grain elevators would have the upper hand in bargaining with
their customers: "the owner could make his rates at will, and compel the public
to yield to his terms, or forego the use.""8 As Rexford Tugwell argued, attending
to the possibility of harm to consumers, particularly in the case of necessities,
thus provided a more coherent frame for understanding Munn and the cases that
followed." 9 Viewed in this light, the German Alliance Insurance case from
1914, which is sometimes cited as the Court's most expansive interpretation of
the "affected with a public interest" category, makes more sense as a descendant
of Munn. In that case, which involved a Kansas statute regulating the price of
fire insurance, the Court noted that the market could not be trusted to generate
fair prices:
The price of insurance is not fixed over the counters of the companies by what
Adam Smith calls the higgling of the market, but formed in the councils of the
underwriters, promulgated in schedules of practically controlling constancy
which the applicant for insurance is powerless to oppose and which, therefore,
exploring the extent to which private property would be subordinated to the public interest). William
Novak, however, has recently argued that scholars of American economic and business regulation should
recognize that Munn was in fact the beginning of a remarkable set of experiments in economic regulation,
largely centered on the modem idea of public utility. See Novak, supra note 10, at 401-04; Novak, supra
note 8.
114. See COMMONS, supra note 12, at 34 ("The decision in Munn v. Illinois recognized
for the first time the economic power of property, or power to withhold, growing out of economic
conditions.").
115. According to Justice Field's dissent, this was the key reason why the legislation
should be struck down. See 94 U.S. at 148-49 (Field, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 131-34 (majority opinion)
117. Id.
118. Id. at 134.
119. See TUGWELL, supra note 8, at 99 ("Because a business is big and powerful, even
because it is monopolistic as we usually use the term, it is not necessarily harmful, nor will the courts
necessarily permit i to be regulated. But when the product it deals in becomes a necessity to all of us, or
at least to many of us; when we are compelled to resort to it and when at the same time unfair rates are
maintained or the service given is inadequate, it then becomes 'clothed with a public interest.' It may be




has led to the assertion that the business of insurance is of monopolistic character
and that "it is illusory to speak of a liberty of contract." 20
Kansas thus chose to enact a scheme of rate regulation for fire insurance,
with the overarching goal of "secur[ing] rates which shall be reasonable to the
insurer and the insured."12' The Court's function in these cases was not to
evaluate the wisdom of any particular type of regulation but rather "to determine
the existence of power" and with it the possibility of economic coercion.122
This general view was reaffirmed and further refined by Chief Justice Taft
in the Wolff Packing case.2 3 In seeking to bring some order to the ongoing
inquiry as to when businesses were sufficiently "clothed with a public interest"
so as to merit regulation, Chief Justice Taft identified three categories: (1)
businesses "carried on under the authority of a public grant of privileges" such
as railroads and the traditional public utilities; (2) certain common carriers and
common callings such as inns, cabs, and grist mills, which had long been
regarded as subject to regulation on behalf of the public; and (3) businesses that
because of economic conditions or circumstances had assumed sufficient
importance to merit regulation.124 It was the third category of businesses that
included those at issue in the Munn line of cases.125 In almost all of these cases,
Chief Justice Taft concluded, "the thing which gave the public interest was the
indispensable nature of the service and the exorbitant charges and arbitrary
control to which the public might be subjected without regulation."126
Three years later, in his dissent in the theatre tickets case, Justice Stone
offered a concise statement of the overall approach, broadening it beyond
necessities:
Statutory regulation of price is commonly directed toward the prevention of
exorbitant demands of buyers or sellers. An examination of the decisions of this
Court in which price regulation has been upheld will disclose that the element
common to all is the existence of a situation or a combination of circumstances
materially restricting the regulative force of competition, so that buyers and
sellers are placed at such a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that serious
120. German All. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 416-17 (1914).
121. Id. at 417.
122. Id. Walton Hamilton referred to the German Alliance Insurance case as "the most
paradoxical of cases . . . in the whole history of price regulation." See Hamilton, supra note 106, at 1098.
The Court's decision, Hamilton argued, "makes the concern of the business to the public the heart of the
matter .... [T]he sanction goes directly back to the law of common callings and the subject is placed
within the province of trade regulation where historically it belongs. The result is a general, if indefinite,
invitation to the legislature to extend price control where public concern demands it." Id. at 1099.
123. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Ct. of Ind. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
124. Id. at 535.
125. Id. at 535-38.
126. Id. at 538.
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economic consequences result to a very large number of members of the
community.127
It was this legacy of Munn that echoed most directly the doctrine of just price
and that would prove to be most relevant for the emerging law of public utility.
In certain industries at certain times, economic conditions created opportunities
for coercion, manifest most often in an ability to impose higher prices on
consumers. Price fixing or rate regulation thus provided a means to restore
equality in exchange and ensure that the proper balance was struck between
buyers and sellers.
This was particularly important in the case of the classic public utilities-
water, electricity, natural gas, telephone-all of which provided economic
necessities to the general public. Given their overall importance to the economy
and their distinctive economic characteristics, these public utilities were widely
viewed as appropriate targets for price regulation. As "the keystones of an
integrated industrial structure, control of which is attended by extraordinary
economic power,"128 they deserved special scrutiny. Simply put, "because such
power lends itself to abuse and tends to be concentrated in relatively few hands,"
rate regulation was needed to protect the public. 129
Like the railroads, these classic public utilities were typically marked by
high fixed-capital requirements, substantial economies of scale, and extensive
reliance on a network infrastructure that was expensive to build and maintain.130
Together, these characteristics led to declining average costs across the relevant
demand curve, creating a situation that economists since the late nineteenth
century had referred to as "natural monopoly."131 As a result, the antitrust laws
were not particularly effective in policing the exercise of market power and
imposing remedies that would restore multi-firm competition.132 Rate regulation
127. Tyson & Bro. U.S. Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 451-52
(1926) (Stone, J., dissenting); see also Hale, supra note 159, at 416 (noting Justice Stone's effort to
broaden the "Taft test" beyond the case of necessities).
128. FRANKFURTER & HART, supra note 107, at 4.
129. Id; see also K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 74 (2017)
("The turn to public utilities as an alternative to private power was thus premised on a distinction between
which industries were more socially vital-and more prone to dangerous concentrations of private
power.").
130. See, e.g., JOHN MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD
COSTS 318-22 (1923) (discussing distinctive economic characteristics ofutilities, including large investments
in highly specialized assets and substantial "economies of size").
131. See Adam Plaiss, From Natural Monopoly to Public Utility: Technological
Determinism and the Political Economy ofinfrastructure in Progressive-Era America, 57 TECH. & CULT.
806 (2016) (discussing the influence of the natural monopoly concept on public utility regulation); PAUL
J. GARFIELD & WALLACE F. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 15-19 (1964) (discussing the
historical understandings of the natural monopoly characteristics of public utilities); see also Manuela
Mosca, On the Origins of the Concept of Natural Monopoly: Economies of Scale and Competition, 15
EUR. J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 317 (2008) (tracing the history of the natural monopoly concept in
economics).
132. See, e.g., Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust




thus provided an alternative means of regulating those sectors of the economy
that were seemingly beyond the full reach of the antitrust laws.133 Put another
way, the economic conditions prevailing in these industries meant that neither
markets nor the antitrust laws could be relied upon to ensure that competition
would be able to regulate prices and protect consumers.134
Building on the experience of state railroad commissions and the Interstate
Commerce Commission, state regulation of public utilities emerged around the
turn of the century.135 Beginning with New York and Wisconsin in 1907, public
utility regulation by state commission spread rapidly across the country in a
"veritable epidemic of laws."136 By 1930, every state but Delaware had a public
utility statute that charged some type of administrative entity with responsibility
for regulating public utilities such as water, gas, and electricity.37 These were
quintessential Progressive-era laws, built on principles of scientific management
the public utilities, .. . experience has hown that ... many of the public works can be conducted with
advantage only upon the basis of exclusive franchise" and concluding that "it is necessary for the
perpetuity of competitive conditions in general, that, in the particular instances of monopolistic conditions,
the state should proceed to establish a legal monopoly and then apply to that situation such strict regulation
as the exigency demands"); see also STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 158 (1982)
(describing the classical view of regulation as "an alternative to antitrust, necessary when antitrust cannot
successfully maintain a workably competitive marketplace of when such a marketplace is inadequate due
to some other serious defect").
133. Of course, the antitrust laws have long been held to apply to certain forms of anti-
competitive behavior engaged in by regulated public utilities. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366, 374-75 (1972) (concluding that he Federal Power Act did not immunize Otter Tail
power from regulation under the antitrust laws for its refusal to deal with municipal utilities).
134. See Hamilton, supra note 106, at 1107 (describing "three presumptions" of price
control to be taken in order: "price is to be left to free enterprise; the antitrust laws are to be used, if need
be, to keep enterprise free; and, if free enterprise cannot be made to work, resort is to be had to formal
price-fixing").
135. See John R. Commons, The Wisconsin Public-Utilities Law, 36 AM. MON. REV.
REVIEWS 221, 221 (1907) (discussing the importance of the Wisconsin Railroad Law of 1905 in
establishing "the principle of regulation through a commission appointed by the Governor" that was
subsequently applied in 1907 to "other public utilities"); Marshall E. Dimock, British and American
Utilities: A Comparison, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 265, 266 (1933) ("[T]he regulation of railways ... furnished
the real institutional foundation for both British and American public utility regulation."). There is a
diverse literature on the origins of public utility regulation, with strong competing explanations between
those advancing a public interest theory or regulation and those arguing for a public choice explanation,
which held that regulated entities actively sought regulation and used it for their benefit. See, e.g., George
J. Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 3, 3 (1971) ("[A]s a rule,
regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit."); see also
Jim Rossi, Public Choice, Energy Regulation and Deregulation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 419, 421-22 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010)
(discussing the capture theory of regulation advanced by Stigler and others and its applicability to
electricity regulation). But see George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of
Regulation " Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289, 323 (1993) ("The search for a single theory of regulation ...
does not illuminate regulatory behavior . . .. [T]he assertion that an agency has been 'captured' by a utility
or is serving that utility's economic interests necessarily is too crude a depiction of the regulatory
relationship.").
136. WILLIAM EUGENE MOSHER, A QUARTER-CENTURY OF REGULATION 35, 36
(1930).
137. See GARFIELD & LOVEJOY, supra note 131, at 32-33. But see William E. Mosher,
Defects ofState Regulation, 201 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 105 (1939) (discussing the wide variation
among state public utility laws regarding scope and authority of the state commissions).
755
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 35, 2018
and regulation by experts.138 Statutory mandates were typically broad and open-
ended, founded on the goal of ensuring that rates were just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory in order to strike the appropriate balance between ratepayers
and investors.139
Widely considered the strongest of the early public utility statutes, the
Wisconsin law was drafted by John Commons.'40 Key features included
mandatory universal service, protected local franchises, delegated powers of
eminent domain, a cost-based "used and useful" standard for valuing assets as
part of rate base, a uniform system of accounting, commission powers of
investigation and adjudication, and, most importantly, a requirement that utility
rates be "reasonable and just."141 The overall goal was to fix rates at a level that
would prevent economic coercion and balance the needs of investors and
ratepayers. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court put it:
It is the duty of the Commission to prevent unreasonable xactions by the utility
on the one hand, and also to protect the rights of investors from confiscation by
imposition of rates which are too low on the other. The rate should be in the
language of the statute 'just and reasonable.' In other words, not so low as to
approach the line of confiscation nor so high as to be unjust and oppressive.
142
138. See, e.g., FINLA G. CRAWFORD ET AL., ELECTRICAL UTILITIES: THE CRISIS IN
PUBLIC CONTROL 35 (William E. Mosher ed., 1929) ("When it was inaugurated, commission regulation
was hailed as the introduction of 'scientific' methods and as the beginning of an era of control which
would be definite, precise and eventually almost automatic.").
139. See, e.g., Eugene A. Gilmore, The Wisconsin Public Utilities Act, 19 GREEN BAG
517, 517-18 (1907) ("The object of the [Wisconsin Public Utilities Act] is to secure adequate service from
all public utilities under conditions which are fair and reasonable, not only to the public, but also to the
corporations concerned . . . .").
140. Commons and others viewed public utility as one of the core concerns of
institutional economics. See, e.g., COMMONS, supra note 12, at 327-29 (discussing the broad concept of
public utility, its relation to "the public," and its application to particular types of businesses); John R. Commons,
Institutional Economics, 26 AM. ECoN. REV. 237, 242 (1936) ("[I]nstitutional economics is the field of the
public interest in private ownership .... "). For an earlier statement on institutional economics and its
attention to problems of social control in modern industrial society, see Walton H. Hamilton, The
Institutional Approach to Economic Theory, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 309, 312-14 (1919). See also Malcolm
Rutherford, Understanding Institutional Economics: 1918-1929, 22 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 277, 299
(2000) ("Public utilities, including issues relating to the valuation of utility property and the proper basis
for rate regulation, were major areas of institutionalist research.").
141. Utility Charges to be Reasonable and Just, 1907 Wis. Sess. Laws 449 ("The charge
made by any public utility ... shall be reasonable and just, and every unjust and unreasonable charge for
such service is prohibited and declared unlawful."); see also Commons, supra note 135, at 222-24
(discussing key features of the Wisconsin law); George B. Hudnall, The Public Service Commission Law
of Wisconsin, 4 PROC. AM. POL. SC. ASS'N. 316 (1907) (elaborating on key features of the Wisconsin
law). On the importance of a uniform system of accounts as a basis for effective regulation in the
Wisconsin law, see CHARLES MCCARTHY, THE WISCONSIN IDEA 192 (1912) ("We cannot attempt o
regulate railroads or great public utilities unless our public service commission is in itself so organized
that it has a thorough understanding of the intricate systems of cost accounting and efficiency used by
these great economic units."); see also Jay H. Price, Jr. et al., Accounting Uniformity in the Regulated
Industries, 30 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 824, 830-36 (1965) (discussing the history of efforts to establish a
uniform system of accounts as a basis for public utility regulation).




As exemplified by the Wisconsin law, these state public utility laws thus gave
the notion of just price a new, more secure legal foundation one that allowed it
to reach deep into private enterprise and, by extension, the larger economy.
The new federal public utility statutes of the 1930s most notably Part II
of the Federal Power Act enacted in 1935 and the Natural Gas Act of 1938-
used similar language, charging the Federal Power Commission (FPC) with
responsibility to ensure that rates for wholesale sales and transmission in
interstate commerce would be "just and reasonable."43 These statutes were
intended to complement state regulation and to fill the gaps that were emerging
as interstate transactions grew. Like its state counterparts, the FPC focused on
setting cost-based rates and policing against discriminatory behavior in
accordance with the just and reasonable standard.
Not surprisingly, these statutory developments and the substantial growth
of public utility regulation that ensued during the first half of the twentieth
century brought forth a massive outpouring of commentary by economists and
lawyers on public utility law and ratemaking.144 Prominent theorists of public
utility and the "social control of business" made recourse to notions of just price
in their efforts to provide historical grounding and justification for these
emerging forms of economic regulation.145 The standard account held that the
basic commitment to fairness and regulation in the public interest that provided
the normative impulse behind public utility regulation derived from medieval
notions of just price.
To take one example, Martin Glaeser, a student and colleague of John
Commons and the author of several leading statements on public utility
regulation, noted in his 1927 treatise that "[a]ll attempts to regulate economic
life owed much to the prevalence of an economic idea which may be traced to
the Church Fathers, namely, the doctrine of "just price."146 According to Glaeser,
St. Thomas Aquinas and the "Schoolmen" considered the just price to be that
143. See Public Utility Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (giving the FPC
jurisdiction over wholesale sales of electricity and transmission in interstate commerce); Natural Gas Act
of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (giving the FPC jurisdiction over wholesale sales ofnatural gas
and transportation in interstate commerce); see also Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas, 320 U.S. 591,
603 (1944) ("The rate-making process under the [Natural Gas] Act, i.e., the fixing of 'just and reasonable'
rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.").
144. See, e.g., Novak, supra note 8, at 168 ("Millions of pages and barrels of ink would
be spent debating such extraordinarily complex things as the best means of calculating a rate of return,
the nature of a 'reasonable' versus an 'unreasonable' rate, and the comparative interests of corporations,
shareholders, and the public at large.").
145. On more general invocations of just price as a basis for the "social control of
business," see JOHN MAURICE CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS 23-25 (1926), which discusses the
Medieval conception of "just price" as part of the historical development of social control of economic
activity. See also EMERY TROXEL, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 4 (1947) ("The 'just' prices of
medieval times are prior examples of social controls of business. Like the reasonable prices of public
utility service, the just prices were ethically controlled prices; they were measures of what a seller ought
to get rather than what the market allowed him to get."); FRANKFURTER & HART, supra note 128, at 1
("The English common law, perhaps continuing familiar church doctrine regarding the just price, gave
ample recognition to the power of the state generally to control prices in the public interest.").
146. MARTIN G. GLAESER, OUTLINES OF PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 157 (1927).
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"price which will repay the expenses of production."147 This doctrine of "just
price" was, in Glaeser's view, the basic "ethical element" at work in modem day
attempts to regulate prices-the "main stem upon which other institutional
developments [in public utility regulation] were grafted."148
For Glaeser and others, the core of the just price doctrine was prevention
of coercion in economic exchange, particularly in the case of necessities.149
Public utility, with its basic commitment to just and reasonable rates, was thus
first and foremost about ensuring that utilities would not be able to raise prices
and harm consumers. This focus on protecting consumers from economic harm
as a result of unequal exchange was at the heart of what Rexford Tugwell referred
to as the "economic basis of public interest."15 0 As Tugwell argued, many of the
early legal theorists writing on public utility and business regulation Edwin
Adler, John Cheadle, and Bruce Wyman among others had been thrown off
track by Munn's categorical distinction between "public" and "private"
businesses. ' 5 It was not the type of business that mattered, Tugwell asserted, but
the broader economic conditions in the market and the possibility that the
business in question could exact unfair gains from consumers.152 When markets
could not be trusted to ensure that prices were fair, regulation was needed.153
Leading institutional economists, Progressive lawyers, and legal realists
shared this view and several of them put economic coercion and ideas of just
147. Id. at 158.
148. MARTIN GLAESER, PUBLIC UTILITIES IN AMERICAN CAPITALISM 197 (1957).
Glaeser's interpretation has proved to be particularly influential on later views. See, e.g., CHARLES F.
PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 89-90 (3d ed. 1993) (citing
Glaeser's discussion of "just price" as one of the antecedents of public utility regulation).
149. See GLAESER, supra note 148, at 196 ("[T]he 'just price' doctrine drew attention
to the coercion which may reside in economic circumstances, such as food famine where a buyer is made
willing by his economic necessities. Hence, in order to draw the sting of coercion, the early Church
Fathers, following St. Augustine, considered only that trading to be legitimate in which the trader paid a
'just price' to the producer, and in selling, added only so much to the price as was customarily sufficient
for his economic support. There was to be no unjust enrichment.").
150. TUGWELL, supra note 8.
151. Id. at 63-79 (reviewing various legal theories of public interest and public utility
regulation).
152. Id. at 81 ("We must forget business organization; let it be what it will; leave that
to the anti-trust acts which are based on a different principle entirely and keep a single mind on the
consumer to see whether or not he is harmed in his dealings with the business in the special economic
sense in which harm is meant here. In this way, we can hope to arrive at a satisfactory interpretation of
public interest.").
153. Id. at 98 ("[C]ourts will permit the regulation of prices and services of the
necessities of life wherever it appears that prices are not being fixed by the higgling of the market, but
rather in the councils of the sellers."). In short, Tugwell's economic basis of the public interest could be
seen as a modern version ofjust price, and it is no surprise, in this respect, that Tugwell made recourse to
medieval economic practices of price fixing in accordance with the doctrine of just price, citing many of
the same authorities that Glaeser cites in his 1927 treatise on public utility. See id. at 81-87. Although
Novak emphasizes the importance of Tugwell's conception of public interest in his recent work on the
origins of the public utility idea, recognizing Tugwell's embrace of consumer disadvantage and public
necessity as bases for regulation, he does not discuss in any detail the overarching concern with fair pricing
and its connections to older understandings of just price that appear to be motivating much of Tugwell's
understanding of the economic basis of the public interest. See Novak, supra note 8, at 158-59.
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price at the center of their more theoretical inquiries. John Commons's notion of
reasonable value, for example, explicitly evoked a commitment to older notions
of just price.'54 For Commons, disparity in bargaining power meant that one
could not assume that the prices that emerged out of market transactions reflected
the "real value" of what was being exchanged.' His theory of reasonable value
thus sought to reflect what would have been the price in the absence of such
disparity. 156 But under modem economic conditions, the possibility of economic
coercion, understood as the power "to withhold from others what they need,"
was pervasive-a fact that the Supreme Court first recognized in Munn.' As
one of the most important experiments of regulation in the public interest, public
utility thus sought to realize the goals of fair exchange and reasonable value by
imposing "new duties of performance, avoidance, [and] forbearance" on the
owners of the business so as to serve "the interests of those who are deemed 'the
public.'"
Like Commons, Robert Lee Hale had a deep and abiding concern with
coercion in economic relationships and gave particular attention to prices. As
Hale pointed out, "prices and price relationships are decisive factors in economic
life."' 59 "Any power on the part of public or private groups to control prices," he
went on, was "a power to control the livelihood of many others."'60 In an
154. Like much of his writing, Commons's discussion of reasonable value is not easy
to follow. It was part of his broader theory of social valuation-grounded in notions of fairness and justice,
but also of social order. Commons rejected the separation of ethics and economics, arguing for an
approach that saw individuals not as "atoms of a population, but citizens of a commonwealth kept together
by inducements and sanctions of scarcity." See COMMONS, supra note 140, at 226; see also id. at 225
("One [theory of the origin of ethics] was the individualistic theory of the maximum of pleasure in a world
of abundance, where the individual could not injure others by taking all he wanted. The other was a social
theory of conflict of interests in a world of scarcity, where the individual may injure others if he takes all
he wants. On the foundation of the latter theory ethics is a historical process developing out of the
decisions of economic disputes, and there is no dualism of ethics and economics.").
155. Id. at 225.
156. For Commons, reasonable value should try as much as possible to accord with
what he referred to as real value as opposed to the nominal values that emerge out of market transactions.
And here, he makes a direct reference to Aquinas and the notion ofjust price:
Do we mean by real value that which is fair and reasonable as between all parties because there
is no coercion or misrepresentation? If so, then nominal value is the actual price but real value
is what ought to have been the price. This was the answer of the theological school whose leader
was Thomas Aquinas, and it is the answer of the modern institutionalists.
Id. at 260; see also Ynge Ramstad, John R. Commons's Reasonable Value and the Problem ofJust Price,
35 J. ECON. ISSUES 253, 2454 (2001) (arguing that Commons's theory of reasonable value "can be
understood as resolving the long-neglected issue that originally stimulated inquiry into market values-
the quest for principles ensuring just prices . . . [and] that at an abstract level, Reasonable Value itself is
nothing other than a coherent and pragmatic, albeit secularized, solution to the problem of just price");
LANGHOLM, supra note 12, at 182-92 (discussing Commons's notion of reasonable value and economic
coercion and their relationship to earlier understandings of just price); Kenneth H. Parsons, John R.
Commons Point of View, 18 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 245, 258-60 (1942) (discussing Commons's
theory of reasonable value).
157. Id. at 52.
158. See COMMONS, supra note 12, at 327.
159. Robert Lee Hale, The Constitution and the Price System: Some Reflections on
Nebbia v. New York, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 401, 401 (1934).
160. Id. at 402.
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economy structured by coercion, market prices, according to Hale, "result from
and register the mutual pressures exerted by buyers and sellers."161 "The amount
of pressure which each can exert," he continued, "is very unevenly distributed,
with the result that some are economically strong, others economically weak."'162
Hale, of course, was also an expert on public utility regulation and, as Barbara
Fried points out, he viewed rate-making as a test case for a broader project aimed
at regulating the terms of economic exchange so as to ensure that no particular
factor of production would receive an unearned surplus or rent at the expense of
the others or of society as a whole.163
But Hale's effort to develop and apply Fabian rent theory to market-based
exchange was more radical than that of Commons, Tugwell, and others.164 While
his basic concern with fairness in economic exchange had obvious similarities to
the idea of just price (a term that Hale does not appear to have used in his
published writings), Hale's understanding of economic coercion went well
beyond any bilateral conception of commutative justice.165 In effect, as soon as
one accepted Hale's starting position: that pre-existing property rules and the
distribution of entitlements created a baseline of coercion in any economic
relationship, the very possibility of commutative justice was subsumed by
distributive justice. With his rent theory of exchange, Hale thus endeavored to
put the commitment to fairness in economic exchange that was at the heart of
commutative justice into the service of a larger agenda aimed at ensuring that
any rents resulting from economic transactions would be redistributed back to
society as a whole.166
Although these efforts to develop a working theory of economic coercion
ultimately failed to get traction in the face of the growing formalization of
neoclassical economics during the middle decades of the twentieth century, their
influence on the broad notion of the public interest that underwrote much of
161. ROBERT LEE HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE
GOVERNING POWER 131 (1952).
162. Id.
163. See FRIED, supra note 112, chs. 4-5 (discussing Hale's development of rent theory
and its application in the context of rate regulation).
164. See, e.g., Robert Lee Hale, Bargaining, Duress, andEconomic Liberty, 43 COLUM.
L. REV. 603, 625-26 (1943) ("The fact that transactions do not deviate from normal market values does
not necessarily indicate that here is a fair relation between the respective bargaining powers of the parties.
The market value of a property or a service is merely a measure of the strength of the bargaining power
of the person who owns the one or renders the other, under the particular legal rights with which the law
endows him, and the legal restrictions which it places on others. To hold unequal bargaining power
economically justified, merely because each party obtains the market value of what he sells, no more and
no less, is to beg the question."); see also FRIED, supra note 112.
165. But see FRIED, supra note 112, at 69 (discussing Hale's "rent-theory version of
distributive justice" and his "intuition that the problem in many so-called 'coercion' cases was at root a
problem ofjust price").
166. Id. at 148-49 ("[Iff there was any moral ground on which to differentiate between
market exchanges, all of which [Hale] had shown to be structurally coercive, it was in the degree to which
a party's power to coerce terms favorable to itself enabled it to extract a reward in excess of sacrifice-
that is, to collect economic rents. The greater the excess, the more readily a legislature should intervene




economic regulation during the early twentieth century and, specifically, on the
practice of public utility regulation persisted. At the heart of their understanding
of public interest and the public utility idea, moreover, was, a working notion of
just price that was flexible and pragmatic. The overriding concern with
preventing coercion as a result of the particular economic conditions that
prevailed in these industries was apparent i  all of the early theories of public
utility. When put into practice through rate regulation, the effort could be viewed
as an ambitious experiment aimed at realizing the goals of commutative justice
in the context of the complex industrial order taking shape in twentieth century
America.'67
B. Fair Value
Putting these commitments to just price and the public interest into practice,
however, proved more difficult than expected, and utility ratemaking would be
subject to a great deal of confusion and controversy for much of the first half of
the twentieth century in no small part because of efforts to translate received
notions of just price into a working doctrine of "fair value" for utility assets.
Twenty-one years after Munn, the Court decided Smyth v. Ames, a case that
involved the question of how to properly value a railroad's investment in its
physical assets (its rate base) without running afoul of constitutional protections
for private property.'68 The resulting rule-that the value of the rate base should
be based on the "fair value" of the assets brought the notion of just price into
the world of property law and imbued it with powerful constitutional
overtones.'69 It also created massive confusion for much of the next half century.
After Smyth v. Ames, the valuation question dominated the field of public
utility law.' Courts and commissions, for their part, struggled mightily to give
167. See Hamilton, supra note 106, at 1111 ("The control of price, like authority in
other industrial affairs, becomes a question of general regulation. It is to be approved or condemned, as
are kindred legislative acts, by reference to the police power. The legislation may be novel, for ways of
getting things done must change with the times. But the constitutional test is an established one; and the
end of it all, the safeguarding of the public against unreasonable prices, goes back to ancient law."); see
also William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1645-51 (2014)
(discussing experimentalist understanding of public utility by Progressives, institutional economists, and
legal realists).
168. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1898) (holding that "the basis of all
calculations as to the reasonableness of the rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway
under legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience of
the public").
169. Id.
170. According to James Bonbright, R. H. Whitten's 1912 treatise, Valuation ofPublic
Service Corporations, represented the first major effort to address valuation "[a]s an elaborate and
organized field of research." James C. Bonbright, Progress and Poverty in Current Literature on
Valuation, 40 Q.J. ECON. 295,295 (1926). Any cursory review of the economic literature, the law reviews,
and legal treatises reveals a large and growing amount of attention directed at the valuation question
throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Bonbright's own two-volume treatise, Valuation of
Property, published in 1937, represented one of the most detailed and systematic efforts to put the issue
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effect to the fair value rule, while lawyers, economists, and engineers engaged
in spirited debate over the proper approach to the valuation of utility assets, their
depreciation over time, how to calculate financing charges, the proper treatment
of land values, taxes, and all manner of operating expenses. Much of the
confusion, it seems, stemmed from the misconceived notion that a utility's assets
had a "fair value" that could be discovered or determined through the application
of particular valuation techniques."' Although Smyth v. Ames listed a range of
factors to consider in such an exercise, later decisions and a large amount of
commentary pushed for an approach that valued the utility's assets at their
present market value.'72 Utility property, in this view, was nothing more than the
exchange value of the assets, and any effort to fix the utility's rates had to take
account of such value in setting such rates.17 3
But as various critics pointed out, and as a moment's reflection reveals,
such a standard was highly unstable, condemning the entire exercise to ongoing
uncertainty.174 Not only did the interpretation of "fair value" as present market
of public utility valuation into its larger context and to clear up some of the confusion created by the fair
value rule.
171. See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 1179 (1937) ("But in certain
legal situations the valuation is meaningless unless it is thought of as a deliberate attempt by the tribunal
tofix values rather than to find them. This is notably true in public utility rate making .... Hence a rate-
making valuation, properly construed, involves a decision as to what the property ought to be allowed to
be worth, not as to what the property is already in fact worth. In practice the courts have accepted many
of the implications of this statement. But they have not suited the words to the action, since the revision
of the words would destroy the specious but convenient analogy between the doctrine of confiscatory rates
and the constitutional provisions against the taking of property without just compensation.").
172. The most sympathetic reading of Smyth v. Ames was that it was a pragmatic
response to the general lack of information on railroad investments. Without such information, original
cost could not serve as the basis for determining the value of the rate base. Courts and commissions thus
turned to a range of factors, including most prominently present market value or reproduction cost. But
even if one grants such a sympathetic reading, by the early twentieth century, the shoddy accounting
practices of the past had been replaced with new, increasingly uniform systems of accounts and much
better information on the costs associated with original investments. See BONBRIGHT, supra note 171, at
1097 (discussing "absence of reliable railroad accounts" as a challenge to use of prudent investment
standard); see also id. (observing that "the persistent refusal of the Court to draw any sharp distinction
between 'fair value' as a standard of proper business conduct, and 'present value' in a commercial sense,
is one of the great tragedies of modern American jurisprudence").
173. See, e.g., Minn. Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 454 (1913) ("As the company may not
be protected in its actual investment, if the value of its property be plainly less, so the making of a just
return for the use of the property involves the recognition of its fair value if it be more than its cost. The
property is held in private ownership and it is that property, and not the original cost of it, which the owner
may not be deprived without due process of law.").
174. The severe criticisms leveled by judges, lawyers, and others against the fair value
rule are well rehearsed. Writing in dissent in a 1935 case regarding telephone rates, Justice Stone described
the effort as "the most speculative undertaking imposed upon [courts] in the entire history of English
jurisprudence." Westv. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.., 295 U.S. 662,689 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court offered a similar lament in a 1923 case on rate base valuation under the
Wisconsin public utilities law. See Waukesha Gas & Elec. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 194 N.W. 846, 850
(1923) (describing the effort to determine "fair value" as "one of the most complex and involved subjects
with which courts are called upon to deal"); see also Gerard Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts
(pt. 3), 33 HARV. L. REV. 1031, 1051 (1920) ("The whole doctrine of Smyth v. Ames rests upon a gigantic
illusion. The fact which for twenty years the court has been vainly trying to find does not exist. 'Fair
value' must be shelved among the great juristic myths of history, with the Law of Nature and the Social
Contract. As a practical concept, from which practical conclusions can be drawn, it is valueless.").
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value tie the whole question of valuation to the constantly shifting fortunes of
the larger economy, but the very exercise of setting rates based on the fair value
of the assets was hopelessly circular given that the value of the utility's assets
depended on the rates that it was allowed to charge."' In effect, the rule created
what Justice Frankfurter referred to as "a maze of cobwebbery"-the practical
import of which was to bring courts deep into the process of ratemaking, forcing
them to police the constitutionality of particular choices made regarding the
valuation of utility assets.176 As one economist writing in 1930 put it:
Unfortunately the fundamental problem of regulation, at least as far as business
aspects are concerned, has been obscured in the entanglements that have arisen
around the concept of fair value. We have been side-tracked so beautifully by
medieval concepts of ajust price and byjuristic concepts of property and property
values . . . that we have paid little attention to the finances and financial
requirements of public service corporations, and to the income which they must
offer their investors and prospective investors in order to maintain their credit
position in competition with other enterprises.
1 77
Another economist, writing at midcentury, claimed that the question of "just
price" as manifest in the fair value rule was "the root of all evils in public utility
regulation."178 Smyth v. Ames, he argued, "settled nothing and bedeviled court
and commission, public and industry, for almost half a century . . .. It became a
175. Robert Lee Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy in Rate Cases, 30 YALE L.J. 710,
716 (1921) ("[T]here are authorities who admit that the value depends upon the earnings, but insist that
the vicious circle involved (in basing the earnings on the value) can be escaped merely by the simple
expedient of measuring the value by replacement cost or some other 'evidence'! Like ostriches, they
imagine that by blinking the fact they can escape its consequences."); see also Mo. ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel.
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 292 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The rule of Smyth v.
Ames sets the laborious and baffling task of finding the present value of the utility. It is impossible to find
an exchange value for a utility, since utilities, unlike merchandise or land, are not commonly bought and
sold in the market. Nor can the present value of the utility be determined by capitalizing its net earnings,
since the earnings are determined, in large measure, by the rate which the company will be permitted to
charge, and thus, the vicious circle would be encountered.").
176. FELIx FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 104 (1930); see also
FRANKFURTER & HART, supra note 128, at 15 ("Beyond question successful regulation cannot be
administered upon a permanently unstable and incalculable rate base."); id. at 10-11 ("No judicial
pronouncements upon matters fundamentally economic run so counter to the views of economists as do
the pre-depression utterances of the Supreme Court upon present value.").
177. D.F. Pegrum, Legal Versus Economic Principles in Utility Valuation, 6 J. LAND &
PUB. UTIL. ECON. 127, 133 (1930).
178. See ELI WINSTON CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 140 (1950); see
also E.A.J. Johnson, Just Price in an Unjust World, 48 INT'L J. ETHICS 165, 173 (1938) ("After seventy-
five years or more of humorous references to 'just price,' the nineteenth-century legislators and judges
began to experiment with a 'fair return on a fair valuation.' From the great number of books and articles
written about a 'fair return' I can find out everything except he meaning of this attractive expression.
Reading between the lines, however, I divine that a fair return is intended to approximate what would
have been obtained if all the benevolent forces of an eighteenth century natural order had been realized.
It is apparently an attempt to achieve by law the never beheld 'normal competitive price' of classical and
neoclassical economics.").
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means by which economic values were created by judicial fiat and the
Constitution was tied to the price level."179
But Smyth v. Ames could hardly be read as a faithful application of just
price. If anything, the fair value rule seemed to violate basic precepts of
commutative justice given the constantly shifting nature of present market value
and the havoc that this created for utility rates. If strictly applied, rates would
fluctuate (sometimes dramatically) depending on what was happening with the
general economy, making it very difficult to police against unfair gains.'
In the wake of "the price revolution" that accompanied World War I and
the massive price swings that occurred in the 1920s and 1930s, the idea that fair
value should be tied to market value looked increasingly untenable.' Much
more consistent with the older doctrine of just price, and much more defensible
from a practical standpoint, was the approach advocated by Brandeis, Hale, and
others to use prudent investment as the basis for determining the value of the
utility's rate base.'82 By focusing on the actual amount of capital invested in the
rate base and looking to conditions in the capital markets to determine the rate
of return a utility needed to continue as a going concern, rates could be tied to
cost-of-service in a way that ensured the proper balance between ratepayers and
investors.
Seen in this way, a public utility was not simply a mass of property that
could be exchanged at fair market value and, as a result, deserving of
constitutional protection against "confiscatory" reductions in such value. Rather,
a public utility was an investment of capital made on behalf of the public-a
going concern that acted as a public servant by providing essential services
179. CLEMENS, supra note 178, at 140.
180. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 159, at 425 ("While the doctrine of the Nebbia case
empowers a state to fix prices as a remedy for extortion, the 'fair value' doctrine, if applied consistently
with the premises on which it is based, inhibits the exercise of that power the moment it becomes
effective.").
181. See, e.g., Martin Glaeser, The Valuation Doctrine at the Crossroads, 3 J. LAND &
PUB. UTIL. ECON. 241, 241 (1927) (noting that the conflicts in how to assess fair value came to a head in
the wake of the "price revolution" that accompanied World War I). The depression put further strain on
efforts to translate fair value into a workable rule for valuation. See, e.g., David E. Lilienthal, Regulation
ofPublic Utilities During the Depression, 46 HARV. L. REV. 745, 745 (1933) ("Every important issue in
the field of public utility regulation, even 'settled' doctrine of the Supreme Court, is being tested and
reexamined in the light of these epochal economic movements.").
182. See, e.g., Mo. ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 308-
10 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing advantages of prudent investment as standard for valuing
rate base); Hale, supra note 175, at 720, 731 (arguing for the abandonment of the "replacement cost"
version of the fair value rule in favor of an "actual cost" rule tied to the reasonable investment made by
the utility); see also FRIED, supra note 112, at 186-89 (detailing the efforts of and correspondence between
Hale, Brandeis, Stone, Bonbright and others to demonstrate the fallacies of the fair value rule and to move
the Court toward a new standard based on prudent investment). As Hale elaborated after the Court had
finally abandoned the fair value rule: "The basic assumption of the prudent investment theory is that a
company should be permitted to obtain from its customers enough money to pay the costs of supplying
the service." See Robert L. Hale, Utility Regulation in the Light ofthe Hope Natural Gas Case, 44 COLUM.




(economic necessities) at a reasonable price.183 As Justice Brandeis put it in a
1923 concurrence that took direct aim at Smyth v. Ames:
The thing devoted by an investor to the public use is not specific property, tangible
or intangible, but capital embarked in the enterprise. Upon the capital so invested
the Federal Constitution guarantees to the utility the opportunity to earn a fair
return .... The Constitution does not guarantee to the utility the opportunity to
earn a return on the value of all items of property used by the utility, or any of
them.18 4
The utility's owners were, of course, free to withdraw their property from public
use and sell it in the market."' But as long as the property was committed to the
public utility, these assets took on a different character:
The investor agrees, by embarking capital in a utility, that his charges to the public
shall be reasonable. His company is the substitute for the State in the performance
of the public service; thus becoming a public servant. The compensation which
the Constitution guarantees an opportunity to earn is the reasonable cost of
conducting the business.18 6
All that the owners were entitled to was a fair return on their capital investment.
The task of rate-making, therefore, was not to discover the intrinsic "fair value"
of the utility's assets as a basis for setting rates, but to decide the rate that would
provide for a proper balance between ratepayers and investors." Just price, in
this context, was not an objective value or intrinsic quality waiting to be
discovered. Rather, it was a price that had to be made and re-made-either in the
market or through the exercise of judgment by the appropriate authorities.
C. End Result
It would take the better part of fifty years for the Supreme Court to clean
up the mess it had made in Smyth v. Ames. After several false starts, the Court
finally succeeded in abandoning the fair value rule in the 1944 Hope Natural
Gas case, extricating the courts from reviewing the methodology of ratemaking
and relegating them to the more appropriate role of policing the constitutional
183. For an early statement along these lines, see Edwin C. Goddard, Public Utility
Valuation, 15 MICH. L. REV. 205, 222 (1917) ("A public utility is something the public needs. It may
build the utility as a public enterprise or leave it to private capital. If it pursue the latter course it practically
says to capital, construct and manage the utility reasonably and the public will make every effort to insure
a fair return on the investment. Fancy prices and fancy profits alike are not allowed, but steady, reliable
promise should attract capital. The returns should be primarily what is fair, first and foremost, to the
public, and second to the public service, in every case to both, if possible.").
184. 262 U.S. 276, 290 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 290.
186. Id. at 290-91.
187. See BONBRIGHT, supra note 171, at 1097.
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boundaries of the end result.88 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas
concluded that
The fixing of prices, like other applications of the police power, may reduce the
value of the property which is being regulated. But the fact that the value is
reduced does not mean that the regulation is invalid. It does, however, indicate
that 'fair value' is the end of the process of rate-making not he starting point ....
The heart of the matter is that rates cannot be made to depend upon 'fair value'
when the value of the going enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates
may be anticipated.189
With Hope, the Court had finally "freed regulation from the obligation to
perform the costly and meaningless rituals of Smyth v. Ames."190 Public utility
lawyers, economists, and judges rejoiced. James Bonbright, perhaps the most
prominent public utility economist of his generation, described the decision as
"one of the most important pronouncements in the history of American law."191
As such, it brought utility rate making into accord with contemporary
currents of administrative law. Expert agencies such as the Federal Power
Commission were now viewed as having primary responsibility for ensuring that
rates satisfied the just and reasonable standard.192 There was no single, correct
methodology no one right way of setting rates, and commissions would
receive deference in their choice of method. For their part, courts would
determine whether the "end result" of the ratemaking exercise, taken in its
188. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) ("Under the
statutory standard of 'just and reasonable' it is the result reached not the method employed which is
controlling .... It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the rate
order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end. The fact
that the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is not then important."). The
majority's reasoning in Hope echoed a concurring opinion by Justices Black, Douglass, and Murphy two
years earlier. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603 (1942) (Black, Douglas
& Murphy, JJ., concurring) ("[T]he value of a going concern in fact depends on earnings under whatever
rates may be anticipated. The present fair value rule creates, but offers no solution to, the dilemma that
value depends upon the rates fixed and the rates upon value .... We know, without attempting any
valuation, that if earnings are reduced the value will be less. But that does not stay the hand of the
legislature or its administrative agency in making rate reductions. As we have said, rate-making is one
species of price-fixing. Price-fixing, like other forms of social legislation, may well diminish the value of
the property which is regulated. But that is no obstacle to its validity.").
189. 320 U.S. at 601.
190. Hale, supra note 192, at 530; see also id. at 496 ("It is to be hoped that the Supreme
Court's tardy but conclusive demonstration of the fair value fallacy will lead commissioners and judges
of lower courts to appreciate that much that has been hitherto stated in decisions stemming from Smyth v.
Ames is irrelevant.").
191. James C. Bonbright, Utility Rate Control Reconsidered in the Light of the Hope
Natural Gas Case, 38 AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465 (1948); see also id. ("Unless the Court again reverses
itself, no longer will it impose upon legislatures or commissions, state and federal, the severe restrictions
upon their power to fix rates that it had previously imposed under its doctrine in Smyth vs. Ames.").
192. Justice Douglas, who authored the majority opinion in Hope, had already made a
strong statement to this effect in his concurring opinion in the earlier Pipeline Case. See Fed. Power
Comm'n, 315 U.S. at 608 (Black, Douglas & Murphy, JJ., concurring) ("[T]he problem of ratemaking is
for the administrative experts not the courts.").
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entirety, satisfied the "just and reasonable standard."'93 To be sure, this carried
with it a duty to ensure that the resulting rates were not so low as to be
confiscatory.'94 But in the vast majority of cases, the courts simply deferred to
the commissions, no longer twisting themselves into knots trying to make the
methods of valuation at the heart of ratemaking comport with received notions
of property and its constitutional protections. As long as rates were within a
"zone of reasonableness"-neither too high nor too low the end result was
justified. Just price and the principles of commutative justice had become an
exercise in administration.
Over time, a general view took hold that rate regulation should try to set
prices at a level that would mimic the prices expected in a competitive market.'95
The proxy used for this counter-factual exercise was cost-of-service. Just and
reasonable rates, therefore, were implicitly judged against a baseline of
competitive markets and the neoclassical assumption that prices in such markets
reflected costs. In a first-best world, the forces of competition would ensure that
prices were just and reasonable. But in industries where this was not feasible,
due to the presence of natural monopoly characteristics or other barriers, price
regulation should strive as much as possible to set rates at levels expected to
prevail in a competitive market. Viewed in retrospect, the entire exercise seemed
oddly circular: because competitive markets cannot work as intended in these
industries, rate regulation is necessary, but in setting rates, every effort should
be made to mimic the outcome of a competitive market. In the end, most
commissions simply embraced a version of cost-of-service ratemaking that was
tied to prudent investments and expenditures as well as a rate of return necessary
to continue accessing the capital markets. As long as they struck an appropriate
193. Hope, 320 U.S. at 602.
194. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, (1989) ("Today we
reaffirm these teachings of Hope Natural Gas: '[I]t is not theory but the impact of the rate order which
counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unreasonable, judicial inquiry ... is at
an end. The fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is not then
important.' This language, of course, does not dispense with all of the constitutional difficulties when
a utility raises a claim that the rate which it is permitted to charge is so low as to be confiscatory: whether
a particular rate is 'unjust' or 'unreasonable' will depend to some extent on what is a fair rate of return
given the risks under a particular rate-setting system, and on the amount of capital upon which the
investors are entitled to earn that return. At the margins, these questions have constitutional overtones."
(citing Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944))); see also A. Lawrence Kolbe &
William B. Tye, The Duquesne Opinion: How Much "Hope" is There for Investors in Regulated Firms,
8 YALE J. ON REG. 113 (1991) (discussing Hope's test); Stephen F. Williams, Fixing the Rate of Return
After Duquesne, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 159 (1991) (discussing the same).
195. In fact, this view had long been apparent but was displaced for decades by debates
over the fair value rule. See, e.g., ROBERT H. WHITTEN, VALUATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS
422 (1912) ("The aim of public regulation is to accomplish what in other industries is assumed to be
accomplished automatically by free competition, that is, to limit the price charged to the normal cost of
production . . . . Normal cost is ordinarily the determining factor in fixing fair, reasonable, or normal
prices in the case of a regulated monopoly.").
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balance between ratepayers and investors, rates were judged to be just and
reasonable.'96
Public utility regulation as it evolved over the course of the twentieth
century thus reflected a blending of the older ideas of just price with more
modem concerns with natural monopoly and the regulatory challenges posed by
large, capital-intensive network industries. In the wake of Hope, ratemaking
came to be viewed as an act of pragmatic adjustment that need not proceed
according to any specific method or approach as long as the resulting rates
preserved the proper balance between ratepayers and investors.'97 Obviously, the
economic conditions and circumstances to which public utility was responding
were vastly different from the simple bilateral model of economic exchange that
informed the Scholastic understanding of just price. But at its core, public utility
rested upon a relationship of reciprocity a balancing of public utility and
disutility captured in the "just and reasonable" standard and the commitment
to ensuring that ratepayers and investors each received the benefits of a fair
exchange.'98 To be sure, viewing public utility as a modem incarnation of
principles of commutative justice and just price might not shed any light on the
practical problems of ratemaking.'9 9 But such a view did (and does) serve as an
196. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1191-92 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (Starr, J., concurring) ("The judiciary is not to micromanage the rate regulation process, just as we
are to be restrained in reviewing the other work of administrative agencies. We are not to impose
procedures that we think are wise or methodologies that we think strike a better balance than that struck
by the regulators. Our limited but vital role is to ensure that the end result of a rate order reasonably
balances investor and ratepayer interests.").
197. See, e.g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776 (1968) ("It follows
that rate-making agencies are not bound to the service of any single regulatory formula; they are permitted,
unless their statutory authority otherwise plainly indicates, to make the pragmatic adjustments which may
be called for by particular circumstances."). In important respects, this reflected the earlier, pragmatic
approach to ratemaking urged by various Progressive era lawyers and legal realists. See, e.g., Henderson,
supra note 174, at 1051 ("The relation between the public utility and the community cannot be expressed
in terms of a simple, quantitatively ascertainable fact, for the relation involves numerous and complex
factors which depend on compromise and practical adjustment rather than on deductive logic."); Walton
H. Hamilton, Price-By Way ofLitigation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1008, 1029 (1938) ("The rate-structure of
an [sic] utility is an aspect of public policy; it is an expression of what the community, acting through the
legislature, commission, and court, expects it to do.").
198. See COMMONS, supra note 12, at 327 ("What is signified by this recent meaning
of 'public utility' springs rather from the idea that, to a certain extent, the business is a peculiar public
disutility and is therefore sorted out for special restraint by imposing on its owners new duties of
performance, avoidance, forbearance, in the interest of those who are deemed 'the public'. Every private
business or job has, in fact, the qualities of both public utility and public disutility, depending on the
current economic and human valuations. And it is in restraining the behavior believed to produce public
disutility, by imposing new duties, that the opposite behavior of other persons believed to produce public
utility is protected and liberated.").
199. See, e.g., JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES
180-81 (2d ed. 1988) (tracing notions of fairness and balance between investors and ratepayers back to
medieval conceptions of "just price" as an ethical rather than an economic concept). Bonbright goes on to
discuss the "babel of confusion as to what constitutes fairness" in setting rates and notes that "the modern
tendency to view fairness criteria of reasonable rates as secondary criteria, to be accepted primarily as
constraints on the application of the so-called economic criteria, is a mark of progress in the development




important reminder of the broader normative commitments that have animated
public utility from its inception.
III. Market Discipline
Notwithstanding the importance of Hope in moving courts and
commissions to a more coherent approach to rate regulation, the actual record of
cost-of-service ratemaking over the course of the twentieth century left much to
be desired. From the beginning, judges, elected officials, utility regulators, and
commentators had complained about various problems with the basic
approach.200 Commissions were often poorly staffed and badly outmatched by
the utilities, a recipe in many cases for capture. Utilities, for their part, sometimes
had incentives to overinvest in their rate base, with limited appetite for
innovation or customer service. Rate cases lasted far too long, overwhelming
commissions and reviewing courts with technical details of mind-numbing
complexity. The overall result was waste, inefficiency, and poor performance.20 '
Starting in the 1960s, these concerns gained renewed vigor and
sophistication at the hands of a new generation of economists and lawyers, many
of whom were associated with the University of Chicago.202 Combining a
general distrust of regulation with the tools of neoclassical price theory, these
critics challenged the very foundations of public utility regulation. For starters,
they argued that the theory of natural monopoly as an ongoing rationale for
regulation was a mistake given that changing economic and technical conditions
made the category itself inherently unstable. 203 Even for those firms operating
in industries with natural monopoly characteristics, moreover, it was not clear
that they would be able to capture monopoly rents on a sustained basis.204 More
200. See Boyd, supra note 167, at 1649, 1654-56 (discussing these early critiques).
201. See Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric
Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 12-13 (1986).
202. Boyd, supra note 167, at 1651-58 (discussing law and economics critique of rate
regulation); see also David Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 765, 771-72 (2008) (discussing economic critiques of rate regulation as a basis for restructuring).
203. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 59 (1968)
("The natural monopoly theory provides no logical basis for monopoly prices. The theory is illogical.
Moreover, for the general case of public utility industries, there seems no clear evidence that the cost of
colluding is significantly lower than it is for industries for which unregulated market competition seems
to work. To the extent that utility regulation is based on the fear of monopoly price, merely because one
firm will serve each market, it is not based on any deducible economic theorem."); Richard A. Posner,
Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 635 (1969) ("Our analysis of proposals for
reforming public utility regulation confirms our preliminary conclusion that its contribution to social and
economic welfare is very possibly negative. The benefits of regulation are dubious, not only because the
evils of natural monopoly are exaggerated but also because the effectiveness of regulation in controlling
them is highly questionable.").
204. See Posner, supra note 203, at 636 ("But natural monopoly conditions are quite
likely to be transient.. . . To embrace regulation because an industry is today a natural monopoly and
seems likely to remain so is to gamble dangerously with the future. To impose regulation on the basis of
a prophecy that the industry will remain monopolistic forever may be to make the prophecy self-
fulfilling."); id. at 643 ("In the long run, there may be few natural monopolies, perhaps none, such is the
pace of change in consumer taste and in technology in a dynamic economy."); see also Rob Van Horn,
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fundamentally, these critics mounted a direct attack on the very idea of public
interest as a rationale for regulation, offering in its place a capture model inspired
by new work in public choice theory. According to economists such as George
Stigler, regulated entities actively sought regulation and used it for their
benefit.20 5 Public utility regulation was thus a product of rent-seeking behavior
on the part of regulated firms; the idea of a general public interest was tenuous
at best.206 Compounding the problem of captured regulators, economic models
and subsequent empirical research also indicated that firms operating under
regulatory constraints had an incentive to overinvest in their rate base, thus
raising costs and destroying consumer welfare (the so-called Averch-Johnson
effect).207
The general conclusion that emerged from these critiques was
straightforward and devastating: regulation did more than harm than good.208
Even in cases of natural monopoly, it was preferable to leave the market alone
rather than try to correct for market failure or remedy the abuses of market power
with regulation.2 09 In fact, according to one study of electricity rates, there was
no evidence that regulation actually had any demonstrable positive effect in
reducing electricity prices when compared to the alternative.2 10 Moreover, the
pathologies of rate regulation-as manifest in the Averch-Johnson effect and the
inevitability of capture meant that even if the regulatory enterprise itself was
born of noble intentions, it was sure to result in diminished social welfare.21 '
Reinventing Monopoly and the Role of Corporations: The Roots of Chicago Law and Economics, in THE
ROAD FROM MONT PELERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE 217 (Phillip
Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe eds., 2009) (discussing Aaron Director's formative role in the "neoliberal
reorientation toward monopoly" at Chicago).
205. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SC. 3, 3 (1971) ("[A]s a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated
primarily for its benefit."); see also Jim Rossi, Public Choice, Energy Regulation and Deregulation, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 419, 421-22 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne
Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010) (discussing the capture theory of regulation advanced by Stigler and others
and its applicability to electricity regulation).
206. See Greg A. Jarrell, The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility
Industry, 21 J.L. & ECON. 269, 271-72 (1978) (criticizing the public interest theory of state public utility
regulation and arguing instead that regulation emerged to serve the interests of utilities).
207. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior ofthe Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1068 (1962) (concluding that firms operating under rate-of-return
constraint of price control have an incentive to substitute capital for other factors of production "in an
uneconomic fashion that is difficult for the regulatory agency to detect"). Their thesis has since been
memorialized as the Averch-Johnson effect.
208. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 203, at 625 ("[T]he social gain from public utility and
common carrier regulation is quite possibly negative.").
209. Demsetz advocated subjecting monopoly franchises to competitive bidding, with
the franchise awarded to the bidder offering to provide service at the lowest price. Demsetz, supra note
203, at 58-62. Posner advocated for emoval of restrictions on entry and lifting of rate controls combined
with a tax on excess profits to mitigate against monopoly rents. Posner, supra note 203, at 639-40.
210. See George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The
Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1962) (concluding that regulation of electric utilities had no
detectable effect on the average level of electricity rates).
211. See, e.g., Paul M. Hayashi & John M. Trapani, Rate ofReturn Regulation and the




During the 1970s, as the economy groaned under the strains of stagflation
and in the midst of an energy crisis brought on by successive oil price shocks,
these criticisms of rate regulation gained considerable traction, providing much
of the intellectual rationale for the broader agenda of deregulation that would hit
full stride in the 1980s. Regulated industries-from trucking and airlines to
telephone, natural gas, and electricity were all viewed as suitable targets for
deregulation. For too long government regulation had stymied the forces of
competition in these sectors, creating a drag on economic growth. The best way
to improve overall consumer welfare was to minimize the role of regulation and
allow markets to flourish.2 12
At a conceptual level, the market was doing an enormous amount of work
for these critics, reflecting a wider valorization of markets and competition
across multiple domains and the concomitant distrust of government that
comprised the main thrust of an emerging neoliberalism.213 Although none of the
major criticisms that comprised the neoliberal critique of regulation were
especially novel, and while all had their own theoretical and empirical
shortcomings, their overall ideological effect was swift and dramatic. Put
crudely, government was now seen as the problem, to paraphrase Ronald
Reagan. Consumers thus needed protection not from the market, but from
captured regulators and the rent-seeking firms that used regulation to avoid
competition. And the surest means to protect consumers and enhance social
welfare was to leave markets alone and allow the forces of competition to
discipline firms and generate prices that would be efficient and fair.
Model, 42 S. ECON. J. 384, 397 (1976) (using a cross-section sample of electric utility firms to provide
empirical support for Averch-Johnson effect that firms operating under ate of return regulation will
produce with a capital-labor ratio greater than the cost minimizing one); Robert M. Spann, Rate ofReturn
Regulation and Efficiency in Production: An Empirical Test of the Averch-Johnson Thesis, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SC. 38, 50 (1974) (reporting results of empirical study of regulated electric utilities
confirming Averch-Johnson thesis that firms subject to rate of return regulation will "overcapitalize").
But see Paul L. Joskow & Roger C. Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview, in STUDIES
IN PUBLIC REGULATION 1, 10-14 (Gary Fromm ed., 1981) (criticizing the assumptions ofAverch-Johnson
model and studies that purport to demonstrate empirical support for the model); JOSKOW &
SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 86 (1988)
(noting the lack of empirical support for the Averch-Johnson effect and observing that during late 1970s
and early 1980s rate-of-return regulation was having the opposite effect with utilities "avoiding making
socially desirable capital expenditures" because expected rates of return were below their costs of capital).
212. There is a broad literature on the efforts to deregulate and restructure these
formerly regulated industries. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1397-1403 (1998) (explaining
move to deregulate substantial portions of common carrier and public utility industries during last quarter
of twentieth century as driven in part by consensus regarding the virtues of markets in delivering public
utility services and enhancing consumer welfare).
213. Cf DANIEL T. RODGERS,AGE OF FRACTURE 47 (2011) ("By the end of the 1970s,
a new idea of the market, cut free from the institutional and sociological relationships constitutive of
earlier economic analysis . .. was being called upon to do unprecedented amounts of thinking."); see also
ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION: REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE THE DEPRESSION 171-
75 (2012) (discussing the market advocacy and critique of regulation advanced by Milton Friedman,
George Stigler, and other members of the Chicago School).
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When translated into a program of actual reform, these critiques led to the
more limited conclusion that some components of those industries previously
viewed as natural monopolies could be unbundled and subjected to the discipline
of the market. Where possible, the thinking went, markets were better than
regulation at ensuring service at lowest possible cost and shifting the risk of poor
investment decisions from ratepayers to shareholders. By relaxing barriers to
entry and lifting price controls, restructuring would allow competition to drive
efficiency, innovation, and improved quality of service.
While deregulation (or, more appropriately, restructuring) played out
differently in different industries, FERC's efforts in restructuring the natural gas
and electricity industries offer particularly illustrative examples of the challenges
involved in relying on markets to ensure fair or just prices. Starting with natural
gas in the 1980s and moving to electricity in the 1990s, FERC used its existing
statutory authority in new and creative ways to impose open access requirements
on natural gas pipelines and the electricity transmission grid, while requiring the
functional unbundling of the natural gas and electricity industries so as to
promote competition in wholesale markets.214 FERC also developed a system of
blanket marketing certificates and market-based rate authority to give
jurisdictional sellers of natural gas and electricity permission to transact freely
in these markets.215 Market screens were used to determine whether those
applying for market-based rate authority had the ability to exercise market power
and distort prices. By insulating markets ex ante from sellers with market power,
FERC assumed that the forces of competition would operate without
interference. Viewed in the context of Hope, the effort constituted a new method
of setting rates that would mobilize competitive markets to ensure that the
resulting prices (the "end result") would satisfy the statutory just and reasonable
standard.216
214. See, e.g., Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing
Self-Implementing Transportation; and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead
Decontrol, FERC Order No. 636, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267, 13,268 to 13,270 (Apr. 16, 1992) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 284 (2017)) (summarizing final rules designed to establish open access regime for the natural
gas pipeline industry as a basis for ensuring competitive natural gas markets); Recovery ofStranded Costs
by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, FERC Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21, 540, 21,541-43
(May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) (summarizing final rules designed to require open
access nondiscriminatory service in order to promote competitive wholesale power markets).
215. See, e.g., Regulations Regarding Blanket Marketer Sales Certificates, FERC Order
547, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,952 (Dec. 8, 1992) (codified as amended 18 C.F.R. pt. 284.202) (establishing system
of blanket marketing certificates for wholesale sales of natural gas); Market-Based Rates for Wholesale
Sales ofElectric Energy, Capacity, and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, FERC Order 697, 72 Fed.
Reg. 39,904 (July 20, 2007) (codified as amended 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (establishing system of market-based
rates for wholesale sales of electricity).
216. To date, the Ninth Circuit and the DC Circuit have agreed with FERC and upheld
its argument that market-based rates satisfy the just and reasonable standard. See, e.g., California ex rel.
Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004) ("In a competitive market, where neither buyer
nor seller has significant market power, it is rational to assume that the terms of their voluntary exchange
are reasonable, and specifically to infer that the price is close to marginal cost, such that the seller makes
only a normal return on its investment."); Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC 908 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir.




The old approach to price making embodied in cost-of-service regulation
would be replaced at least in part by new ways of price making that depended
much more fundamentally on markets to ensure that prices were just and
reasonable.217 In making this move, FERC effectively resurrected an earlier
understanding of just price as that which prevailed in open and competitive
markets. As long as competition was robust, buyers and sellers alike would be
protected against the exercise of economic coercion and prices would be fair.
Only in cases of market power would FERC need to step in and assert its
authority to fix prices. Otherwise, light-handed regulation aimed at ensuring that
markets functioned as intended would suffice.2 18
But FERC's efforts to transform itself from an agency focused on cost-of-
service ratemaking to one responsible for market design and oversight proved to
be easier said than done and the Commission has struggled over the last two
decades to discharge its new responsibilities. Although a thorough discussion of
FERC's efforts in this respect is beyond the scope of this Essay, suffice it to say
that the California energy crisis of 2000-01, which greatly disrupted both gas and
electricity markets throughout the western United States, illustrated how fragile
these new markets were, how relatively easy they were to manipulate, and how
much market design and oversight mattered.219 For its part, FERC recognized
Pub. Util. Dist. No. I of Snohomish Cty., 544 U.S. 527, 538 (2008) ("We have not hitherto approved, and
express no opinion today, on the lawfulness of the market-based-tariff system, which is not one of the
issues before us."); id. at 548 ("We reiterate that we do not address the lawfulness of FERC's market-
based rates-policy, which assuredly has its critics. But any needed revision in that policy is properly
addressed in a challenge to the policy itself"); see also David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The
Transformation ofAmerican Energy Markets and the Problem ofMarket Power, 53 BOS. C. L. REV. 131,
197-200 (2012) (surveying the doctrinal landscape regarding question whether market based rates satisfy
the just and reasonable standard).
217. See, e.g., FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 (2016) ("In this
new world [of competitive wholesale power markets], FERC often forgoes the cost-based rate-setting
traditionally used to prevent monopolistic pricing. The Commission instead undertakes to ensure "just
and reasonable" wholesale rates by enhancing competition-attempting, as we recently explained, 'to
break down regulatory and economic barriers that hinder a free market in wholesale electricity."' (quoting
Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 536)).
218. See, e.g., Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing
Self-Implementing Transportation; and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead
Decontrol, Order No. 636, 57 Fed. Reg. 13267, 13297 (Apr. 16, 1992) ("[T]he Commission is instituting
light-handed regulation, relying upon market forces at the wellhead or in the field to constrain unbundled
pipeline sale for resale gas prices within the NGA's 'just and reasonable' standard."); see also United
Distribution Cos. v. FERC, 83 F.3d 1105, 1122 (1996) (observing that with its natural gas restructuring
effort FERC "has gradually withdrawn from direct regulation of certain industry sectors in favor of a
policy of 'light-handed regulation' when market forces make that possible").
219. There is a voluminous literature on the California electricity crisis. See, e.g., Frank
A. Wolak, Diagnosing the California Electricity Crisis, 16 ELECTRICITY J. 11, 20 (2003) (noting that
"average market performance over the first two years of the market, from April 1998 to April 2000, was
close to the average competitive benchmark price" and compared favorably to performance in the eastern
ISOs); CHRISTOPHER WEARE, THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS: CAUSES AND POLICY OPTIONS 1-2
(2003) (describing the severe malfunctioning of the California electricity market beginning in the late
spring of 2001); Severin Borenstein, The Trouble With Electricity Markets: Understanding California's
Restructuring Disaster, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 198-200 (2002) (discussing substantial increases in
California wholesale power prices in summer of 2000); Paul L. Joskow, California's Electricity Crisis,
17 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 365, 365, 377-78 (2001) (discussing increases in wholesale electricity
773
Yale Journal on Regulation
that it had been nafve in its assumption at the outset of the crisis that market
forces should be allowed to run their course and that light-handed regulation was
sufficient.220
Since the crisis, FERC has worked hard to enhance its market oversight
capacities, paying much more attention to price formation, the exercise of market
power, and the possibility of manipulation. Congress also stepped in with a suite
of new rules to improve the functioning of natural gas and electricity markets
and gave significant new enforcement authority to FERC.221 New codes of
conduct, new anti-manipulation rules, improved transparency, and expansive
new civil and criminal penalty authority have provided the foundation for a much
more robust approach to market oversight and enforcement.
But even with these new authorities, the Commission continues to face
significant challenges in overseeing these markets. Relying on the discipline of
the market to ensure that prices will be just and reasonable, it turns out, has
required quite a bit of work. These markets cannot be left to their own devices,
but demand active management and oversight on the part of FERC. The whole
notion of a light-handed regulatory posture is belied by the multiple layers of
regulation needed to ensure their proper functioning and police against the
exercise of market power. Since 2007, moreover, FERC has secured more than
$760 million in civil penalties and more than $478 million in disgorged profits
in market manipulation cases in the natural gas and electricity sectors.222 In all
prices in California); see also Paul L. Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets
in the UnitedStates, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 1,32 (James M. Griffin
& Steven L. Puller eds., 2005) (reporting that in the wake of the California electricity crisis, no additional
states had announced plans to pursue electricity restructuring and nine states that had planned to
implement reforms had "delayed, canceled, or significantly scaled back their electricity competition
programs"); David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 417, 417 (2005) ("California's disastrous experience with restructured electricity markets
has given pause to restructuring's proponents and ammunition to restructuring's opponents."); Joel B.
Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in Electric Utility
Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 557-58 (2005) ("In the aftermath of competition's
disastrous failure in the early 2000s in California, states are beginning to slow, alter, or even reject
progress toward restructuring, even where it had been embraced earlier.").
220. See, e.g., Staff White Paper on Anti-Market Manipulation Enforcement Efforts Ten
Years After EPAct 2005, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N 2 (2016), http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports
/2016/marketmanipulationwhitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/N6B7-X666] [hereinafter FERC White Paper]
("During the Western Energy Crisis, the Commission's enforcement tools lagged behind these market
developments, and the [manipulation] schemes exposed a major weakness in the Commission's ability to
fulfill its core mission of ensuring just and reasonable rates and protect energy market participants and
consumers."); see also David B. Spence, Naive Energy Markets, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973 (2017)
(discussing mistaken assumption among proponents of deregulation that energy markets can function
without significant government involvement).
221. Energy Policy Act of 2005, §§ 314-16, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (adding
new provisions to the Natural Gas Act regarding market manipulation, penalty authority, and market
transparency); id. §§ 1281-84 (adding new provisions to the Federal Power Act regarding market
manipulation, penalty authority, and market transparency); see also FERC White Paper, supra note 220
(reviewing FERC's use of these new authorities).
222. Total Civil Penalties assessed for all years 2007 to present: $762,991,012. Total
Disgorgement ordered for all years 2007 to present: $478,976,028. See All Civil Penalty Actions, FED.




of this, the key challenge confronting FERC has been (and will continue to be)
whether the prices that are formed in these markets are just and reasonable-
whether the market price is, in fact, the just price.
Conclusion
It is always difficult to seek to enter the moral universe of people living in
faraway times and places. But any honest genealogy of public utility and
economic regulation more generally requires at least some engagement with
conceptions of economic justice that were developed in circumstances vastly
different from our own. The idea ofjust price grew out of attempts to develop an
ethical approach to economic exchange as part of a broader effort to give shape
to Aristotle's notion of corrective justice. Thomas Aquinas and the Scholastics
preferred to use the term commutative justice to capture this broader meaning of
equality in exchange and to focus on the elements of proper dealing in economic
transactions. Just price was at the core of their economic doctrine, tied to the
common estimation of the community and placed in service to their vision of a
just society.
Over time, the idea of just price became a rallying cry for the crowd during
times of grain shortages and a basis for price-control schemes enacted by
authorities to avoid subsistence crises in the face of market disruption. Just price
thus provided a standard by which the crowd and the authorities could police
against the exercise of unfair advantage in market exchange. In its strong form,
it operated as a powerful norm against which to evaluate various market
transactions. When markets functioned well in the presence of robust
competition, there was little need for intervention, and the prevailing market
price was taken to be the just price. But the medieval schoolmen, like the police
des grain, the rioting crowds, and many others since, recognized that markets
don't always work as intended. The invocation of just price as a basis for
intervention in the market, especially in cases of necessities and in times of
dearth, thus reflected a realistic assessment of the place of markets in people's
lives and an affirmation that markets should always be subordinated to society.
Ideas of just price show up again as an anchor for the equitable conception
of contract and as a basis for the doctrines of unconscionability and economic
duress. Many of the early examples of price fixing and economic regulation in
England, colonial America, and the early United States also made use of just
price. Most importantly for this Essay, just price provided much of the normative
core of the new public interest standard articulated in the Munn case and
elaborated during the so-called public utility era of the late nineteenth and early
perma.cc/N4MM-ES5N]; see also Staff White Paper on Anti-Market Manipulation Enforcement Efforts
Ten Years After EPAct 2005 FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N (2016), http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-
reports/2016/marketmanipulationwhitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/G87J-7TYS] (reviewing ten years of
experience investigating and pursuing actions under the Commission's anti-manipulation rules).
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twentieth centuries-a standard that was finally codified in state and federal
public utility statutes with their requirements that rates be just and reasonable.
On a more theoretical level, just price can be found lurking behind
conceptions of value in classical political economy, where value is viewed as the
prime mover behind prices.223 In a later context, echoes ofjust price can be heard
in the work of a number of prominent Progressive era lawyers, institutional
economists, and legal realists as they sought to elaborate an economics that took
law, institutions, conflict, and power seriously.
Throughout this long history, the idea of just price took on a variety of
meanings-embracing, at times, notions of social status; the idea that goods had
an inherent, objective value; cost of production; and the prices that emerged from
the operation of competitive markets operating under "normal" conditions. But
what gave it bite, this Essay has argued, was the focus on economic coercion and
the ways in which changing economic conditions created new possibilities for
coercion. From this perspective, just price was not tied to any particular form of
regulation or any particular type of economy. The basic commitment to ensure
fairness-to ensure that both sides to an exchange received the benefits of a fair
bargain applied across all forms of economic organization. While not wholly
dismissive of more modem notions of willingness to pay, just price did not
accept that this was all that mattered in economic transactions, and thus rejected
the wholesale embrace of willingness to pay as the foundation for price.
Looking back, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that just price operated
largely as a metaphor capable of taking on many guises-an empty vessel into
which a wide variety of normative content could be poured. In this respect, of
course, it was not unlike many other prominent economic concepts-value,
market, competition, etc. As Joan Robinson reminds us, however, there is
sometimes much to learn from the problems that are surfaced in the efforts to
grapple with such concepts.224 The very fact that they have such a hold on our
thinking, of course, also demands close attention to their public lives.
Just price, in this respect, is less interesting as a stand-alone idea than in the
ways it gets mobilized in struggles over economic governance and economic
justice. It is in this more dynamic context that the struggles over the meaning of
just price reveal certain problems in understanding and governing economic
relationships. To be sure, just price has never offered a single, stable standard
against which to judge economic relationships, and it is certainly not an
analytical tool for understanding economic behavior. But it does remind us of
the relational aspects of price, and the thick social and moral character of
economic life.
Put another way, just price reminds us that price is more than just a signal;
that it is also a relationship-one that is conditioned by background entitlements
and the larger field of force within which buyers and sellers operate. It reminds
223. See Robinson, supra note 56; Heilbroner, supra note 34.




us that there exists alongside the thoroughly de-moralized conception of the
economy that we have inherited from neoclassical economics, a thoroughly
moral economy, and that markets and the mechanisms of price formation at their
center are perhaps more vulnerable to disruption and manipulation than standard
economic models suggest. And it reminds us that for a very long time far
longer than the lifespan of classical and neoclassical economics-ethical and
social concerns were intimately bound up with conceptions of economy,
economic life, and the provision of necessities.
Part of the reason, then, to trace the history of the idea of just price and its
influence on economic regulation is to show how it was mobilized over time in
what were, at root, struggles over key systems of provisioning for the broader
economy. With its basic commitment o fairness, just price reflected the view
that these systems of provisioning needed careful attention that they could not
be left exclusively to the workings of the market. When embodied in modem
public utility law, this commitment represented an important experiment in
translating abstract ideas of economic justice and fair pricing into working rules.
And while it may be the case that the experiment has run its course and that we
need to find other tools or instruments to manage contemporary economic
challenges, we would do well to remember the general normative impulse at the
heart of public utility as we think about the prospects and possibilities for
economic justice in our own time.
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